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1 
Planetary Defense: Near-Earth Objects, Nuclear 
Weapons, and International Law 
 
 BY JAMES A. GREEN 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The risk of a large Near-Earth Object (NEO), such as an asteroid, 
colliding with the Earth is low, but the consequences of that risk 
manifesting could be catastrophic. Recent years have witnessed an 
unprecedented increase in global political will in relation to NEO 
preparedness, following the meteoroid impact in Chelyabinsk, Russia in 
2013. There also has been an increased focus amongst states on the 
possibility of using nuclear detonation to divert or destroy a collision-
course NEO—something that a majority of scientific opinion now appears 
to view as representing humanity’s best, or perhaps only, option in extreme 
cases. Concurrently, recent developments in nuclear disarmament and the 
de-militarization of space directly contradict the proposed “nuclear 
option” for planetary defense. In the context of significant developments 
that have occurred in relation to NEO impact risk over the last five years, 
this article analyses the question of whether a nuclear NEO response 
would (or could) be permissible under international law. Potential 
restrictions and prohibitions under treaty law are assessed, as are a range 
of mechanisms that may act to preclude possible illegality. The article 
concludes by advancing a tentative proposal for a move towards (strictly 
limited and safeguarded) legal preparedness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Who knows whether, when a comet shall approach this globe 
to destroy it, as it often has been and will be destroyed, men will 
not tear rocks from their foundations by means of steam, and hurl 
mountains, as the giants are said to have done, against the flaming 
mass? 
– Lord Byron, 18221 
 
In director Michael Bay’s schlocky sci-fi movie, Armageddon—which 
inexplicably became the highest grossing film worldwide in 19982—master 
oil-driller Bruce Willis and an unlikely crew of misfits place a nuclear 
bomb inside an asteroid heading for Earth to blow it up and save humanity. 
Armageddon is a film full of blockbuster nonsense and implausibility. 
However, the notion at the heart of its plot, of using a nuclear explosion to 
avert a cataclysmic Near-Earth Object (NEO)3 collision, is not one of 
science fiction.  
Nuclear explosives have been explored seriously as an option for 
responding to potentially hazardous NEO impact since the 1960s.4 Recent 
developments, however, mean that a fresh appraisal of this possibility is 
especially timely. The last five years experienced an unprecedented 
increase in international political will to respond to the threat posed by 
NEOs,5 particularly following the 2013 meteoroid impact in Chelyabinsk, 
Russia.6 Furthermore, it is not merely the case that the risk of harmful NEO 
collision has recently gained significant global “traction”: this shift 
involved a much greater focus on the use of nuclear devices as a method of 
 
 1. THOMAS MEDWIN, CONVERSATIONS OF LORD BYRON: NOTED DURING A RESIDENCE 
WITH HIS LORDSHIP AT PISA, IN THE YEARS 1821 AND 1822 288 (1824). 
 2. NATASHA O’HEAR & ANTHONY O’HEAR, PICTURING THE APOCALYPSE: THE BOOK OF 
REVELATION IN THE ARTS OVER TWO MILLENNIA 178 (2015). 
 3. The term “NEO” covers a range of natural space objects: asteroids, comets, 
meteoroids, meteoroids, meteorites, etc. For the distinctions between them, see DONALD K. 
YEOMANS, NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS: FINDING THEM BEFORE THEY FIND US 6–12 (2d prtg. 
2016); for descriptions of some these different types of NEO, see Paul Rogers, Comet? 
Meteor? Asteroid? Here’s How to Tell the Difference, THE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 10, 
2013), https://www.mercurynews.com/2013/03/10/comet-meteor-asteroid-heres-how-to-tell-
the-difference. 
 4. See, e.g., PROJECT ICARUS: MIT STUDENT PROJECT IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (LOUIS 
A. KLEIMAN ed., 1968) (an example of influential early work on the subject). 
 5. See discussion infra Section II. 
 6. For more discussions of the 2013 Chelyabinsk impact, see infra notes 36-38 and 
accompanying text. 
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responding to that risk.7 The “nuclear option” is now, for the first time, 
truly on the global agenda. However, the last five years also has seen major 
advances in both nuclear disarmament and de-weaponization of space 
initiatives, shifts in political will that seemingly directly contradict the rise 
in support for nuclear explosive approaches to NEO response.  
This article sets the notion of nuclear detonation as a means of 
diverting or destroying NEOs in scientific and political contexts, and then 
specifically examines whether such an act of nuclear planetary defense 
would (or could) comply with international law.8 Voluminous legal 
literature exists concerning issues of nuclear non-proliferation, regulation, 
and disarmament.9 Similarly, there is a large amount of space law 
scholarship,10 including notable literature on the question of “planetary 
 
 7. See discussion infra Section III. 
 8. As a result of this focus, it is important to note two related areas with which this 
article does not engage. First, the emphasis herein on the avoidance of NEO impact means 
that legal obligations relating to the mitigation of the injurious consequences of an actual 
impact are not discussed. This is without prejudice to the importance of the law relating to 
measures such as pre-emptive disaster preparedness (e.g., evacuation, property protection, 
early-warning notification, etc.) and post-disaster response/rebuilding. See generally Evan 
R. Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just Won’t Do: The Legal Basis for International 
Cooperation in the Mitigation of Asteroid Impacts and Similar Transboundary Disasters, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 1091 (2002); Evan R. Seamone, The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected”: 
Mitigating Extreme Natural Threats to the Global Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet 
Impacts with the Earth, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735 (2003); Evan R. Seamone, The 
Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense: Achieving the Mandate to Defend 
the Earth Against Asteroid and Comet Impacts While There is Still Time, 17 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
Secondly, this article is concerned with the “threshold” question of whether nuclear 
NEO response would be “lawful” or “unlawful.” It does not, therefore, engage with 
subsequent legal questions concerning liability should damage/harm result from a planetary 
defense attempt, as most notably might arise under the Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects 1972 (entry into force Sept. 1, 1972) 961 U.N.T.S. 
187. On liability in outer space generally, see Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 346 (1980). For a discussion of 
possible liability issues specially in the context of NEO response, see Legal Aspects of NEO 
Threat Response and Related Institutional Issues: Final Report, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln Program on Space and Telecommunications Law, 18–24, 31 (Feb. 9, 2010), 
https://swfound.org/media/40426/legal_aspects_neo_response_institutional_issues_final_re
port.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jonathan L. 
Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., three volumes: vol. I 2014, vol. II 2015, vol. III 2016) 
(providing an extensive overview of the subject, with a wide range of contributing experts). 
 10. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 
2015); ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW (Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey 
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protection” in a general sense (focusing, for example, on matters such as 
space debris and the environmental effects of human activity in space).11 
There have, however, been extremely few examinations of the particular 
issue of the legality of using nuclear explosive devices against NEOs; the 
limited literature on the question that does exist is comparatively brief, and, 
moreover, much of it was written in the 1990s.12 This article updates, 
expands, and advances that work. 
The first part of the article, comprising sections I–IV, is deliberately 
“non-legal” in nature. It sets out the wider context for nuclear NEO 
responses in a manner intended to be detailed but accessible for 
international lawyers (who may be unfamiliar with the scientific and 
political milieu in which the possibility of nuclear NEO response sits). 
Section I considers the risk and consequences of NEO impact. Section II 
then explores the recent global political shift towards preparedness for the 
manifestation of that risk at the state and inter-state levels. The means of 
responding to potentially harmful NEOs are considered in section III: in 
particular, the increased focus on nuclear approaches, and the reasons for 
this, are explored. The first part of the article concludes, in section IV, by 
considering counterarguments against the use of nuclear explosions to avert 
 
eds., 2017) (both providing recent overviews of the subject, with a wide range of 
contributing experts). 
 11. See, e.g., E. Fasan, Planetary Protection – Some Legal Questions, 34 ADVANCES IN 
SPACE RESEARCH 2344–53 (2004) (providing a detailed literature review). 
 12. For the relevant literature from the 1990s, see Michael B. Gerrard & Anna W. 
Barber, Asteroids and Comets: U.S. and International Law and the Lowest-Probability, 
Highest Consequence Risk, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 4, 32–48 (1997); John C. Kunich, 
Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, 41 AIR FORCE L. REV. 119 (1997); 
Eugene Brooks, Dangers from Asteroids and Comets: Relevance of International Law and 
the Space Treaties, 40 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 234, 246–247 (1997); K. Sweet, Planetary 
Preservation: The Need for Legal Provision, 15 SPACE POL’Y 223 (1999); Paul R. 
Weissman, The Comet and Asteroid Impact Hazard in Perspective, in HAZARDS DUE TO 
ASTEROIDS AND COMETS 1191, 1206 (Tom Gehrels ed., 1994). There has been some relevant 
literature published since 2000: however, to the knowledge of the present author, all such 
examinations only have considered the particular question of nuclear responses as a small 
part of a wider discussion, assessing this briefly in a few pages. See Legal Aspects of NEO 
Threat Response, supra note 8, 25–28; Fabio Tronchetti, International Legal Consideration 
of Cosmic Hazards and Planetary Defense, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND 
PLANETARY DEFENSE 1027, 1036–37 (Joseph N. Peltona & Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015); 
Jinyuan Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence: Obstacles in Existing International 
Law and Implications for Space Arms Control, 34 SPACE POL’Y 1, 2 (2015); Jinyuan Su, 
Control Over Activities Harmful to the Environment, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPACE 
LAW 73, 85 (Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017); Virgiliu Pop, Legal 
Considerations on Asteroid Exploitation and Deflection, in ASTEROIDS: PROSPECTIVE 
ENERGY AND MATERIAL RESOURCES 659, 675–676 (Viorel Badescu ed., 2013); Seamone, 
Wishing on a Star, supra note 8, at 1106 n.73; Fasan, supra note 11, at 2346, 2349. 
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NEO impact, including through charting the recent progress in the nuclear 
disarmament and space de-militarization movements. 
The second part of the article, comprising sections V–VII, shifts to an 
analysis of the legal aspects of nuclear NEO response. Section V considers 
possible prohibitions or restrictions on such action under existing treaty 
law. It is argued that the widely held view13 that nuclear NEO response 
would be prima facie unlawful is likely correct, but not self-evident. 
Section VI then assesses existing mechanisms that may be able to preclude 
the apparent unlawfulness of such action. Given that the existing legal 
position is unclear and complex, section VII concludes with the tentative 
suggestion that a new (limited and safeguarded) legal exception should be 
created, operating through a bespoke multilateral body for decision-making 
and oversight. 
 
II.  NEO IMPACT RISK 
 
Given the long-standing, tabloid-fueled climate of “asteroid paranoia” 
in modern western culture,14 it is important not to overstate the threat that 
NEOs pose. At the same time, the very factors that have contributed to this 
“asteroid paranoia”—sensationalism in the media and entertainment 
industry—also mean that it is easy to dismiss calamitous NEO impact as a 
concern that should be reserved for science fiction fans and conspiracy 
theorists.15 It therefore also is important not to understate the risk posed by 
NEOs. 
Our planet is bombarded on a daily basis by NEOs.16 However, the 
vast majority of NEOs (whether known or unknown) represent no risk 
whatsoever, because if they do cross paths with the Earth, they break up 
into harmless debris in its atmosphere.17 It is only a particular, extremely 
 
 13. See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Felicity Mellor, Negotiating Uncertainty: Asteroids, Risk and the Media, 19 
PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF SCI. 16 (2010); David Morrison, Hyperbole in Media Reports on 
Asteroids and Impacts, THE SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 29. 
 15. Seamone, Wishing on a Star, supra note 8, at 1108–11. 
 16. JONATHAN POWELL, COSMIC DEBRIS: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
130 (2017). 
 17. See Small Asteroids Hit Earth More Often Than You Think, NAT’L AERONAUTICS 
AND SPACE ADMIN., Nov. 16, 2014, https://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/20 
14/16nov_bolides; Justin L. Koplow, Assessing the Creation of a Duty under International 
Customary Law Whereby the United States of America Would be Obligated to Defend a 
Foreign State Against the Catastrophic but Localized Damage of an Asteroid Impact, 17 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 279 (2005). 
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small proportion of NEOs—a subset designated by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as Potentially Hazardous 
Asteroids (PHAs)—that may pose any danger.18 As of September 4, 2018, 
there are somewhere in the region of 1,900 known PHAs.19 
Data on previous PHA impacts with Earth and the consequences of 
them remain imprecise.20 It nonetheless has been argued by some scholars 
that there may have been as many as six extinction-level events stemming 
from NEO collision in the history of the planet,21 including, of course, the 
widely accepted explanation for the demise of the dinosaurs around 65 
million years ago.22 Rather more recently, Jupiter was bombarded by 
fragments of the “Shoemaker-Levy Comet” for over a week in 1994,23 with 
one large fragment causing a darkness to cover a region of the planet of 
around 12,000 km in diameter (roughly the size of Earth).24 It has been 
postulated that had Shoemaker-Levy hit Earth instead of Jupiter—our near 
neighbor in astronomical terms—it may have wiped out all of humanity.25 
The chance of a civilization-ending collision occurring any time soon, 
however, is very small; it thus represents a paradigmatic example of what 
risk analysts term a LP/HC (low-probability/high-consequence) event.26 
 
 18. PHAs are defined based on the coalescence of two factors: their size (larger than 
140 meters in diameter), and their proximity to Earth (closer than 4,650,000 miles). See 
Center for Near-Earth Object Studies, NEO Basics, NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 
ADMIN., https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/about/neo_groups.html. 
 19. The International Astronomical Union’s Minor Planet Center provides a list of all 
known PHAs, updated daily, https://www.minorplanetcenter.net/iau/MPCORB/PHA.txt. 
 20. See, e.g., Richard A.F. Grieve & David A. King, The Geologic Record of 
Destructive Impact Events on Earth, in COMET/ASTEROID IMPACTS AND HUMAN SOCIETY: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 1, 4 (Peter T. Bobrowsky & Hans Rickman eds., 2007) 
(in general, but particularly 4, noting that “the terrestrial impact record contains a number of 
biases …”). 
 21. See Michael R. Rampino & Bruce M. Haggerty, Extraterrestrial Impacts and Mass 
Extinctions of Life, in HAZARDS DUE TO ASTEROIDS AND COMETS 827 (Tom Gehrels ed., 
1994). However, there is some uncertainty on the exact number, and other scholars have 
estimated that there may only have been five such events, see e.g. Brooks, supra note 12, at 
235. 
 22. See generally CHARLES FRANKEL, THE END OF THE DINOSAURS: CHICXULUB CRATER 
AND MASS EXTINCTIONS (1999). 
 23. See generally DAVID H. LEVY, IMPACT JUPITER: THE CRASH OF SHOEMAKER-LEVY 9 
(1995). 
 24. THOMAS H. BURBINE, ASTEROIDS: ASTRONOMICAL AND GEOLOGICAL BODIES 225 
(2017). 
 25. Seamone, Wishing on a Star, supra note 8, at 1104. 
 26. See generally LOW-PROBABILITY HIGH-CONSEQUENCE RISK ANALYSIS ISSUES, 
METHODS, AND CASE STUDIES (Ray Waller ed., 1984); Shu Li, Jin-Zhen Li, Yi-Wen Chen, 
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The “Torino Scale,” employed by NASA to quantify NEO risk, states that 
such potentially extinction-causing impacts “occur on average once per 
100,000 years, or less often.”27 Yet, while Torino Scale’s risk assessment 
empirically models the statistical likelihood of harm based on known 
previous impacts and identified PHAs currently in outer space, it only does 
so as an average, which might be somewhat misleading.28 NEO collision is 
random, not neatly periodic,29 meaning that the Torino Scale’s estimate 
should not be taken to indicate that the next such impact necessarily will be 
thousands of years in the future.  
Further, much more likely than a “doomsday collision,” albeit still 
being of relatively low probability, are collisions of a smaller scale that 
nonetheless could cause significant destruction on a local or regional 
scale.30 A famous example31 of such an impact is the NEO that exploded—
due to entering the Earth’s atmosphere at an especially high velocity32—
above Tunguska, Siberia, Russia in 1908.33 Despite being what today 
 
Xin-Wen Bai, Xiao-Peng Ren, Rui Zheng, Li-Lin Rao, Zuo-Jun Wang & Huan Liu, Can 
Overconfidence be Debiased by Low-Probability/High-Consequence Events?, 30 RISK 
ANALYSIS 699 (2010). In relation to the LP/HC nature of NEO collision specifically, see 
Clark R. Chapman, The Hazard of Near-Earth Asteroid Impacts on Earth, 222 EARTH & 
PLANETARY SCI. LETTERS 1, 9 (2004); Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 4; Seamone, 
Wishing on a Star, supra note 8, at 1095. 
 27. Center for Near-Earth Object Studies, Torino Impact Hazard Scale: Assessing 
Asteroid and Comet Impact Hazard Predictions in the 21st Century, NAT’L AERONAUTICS 
AND SPACE ADMIN., https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/sentry/torino_scale.html. See also Jason C. 
Reinhardt, Xi Chen, Wenhao Liu, Petar Manchev & M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Asteroid 
Risk Assessment: A Probabilistic Approach, 36 RISK ANALYSIS 244 (2016). 
 28. See Chapman, supra note 26, at 8; Clark R. Chapman & David Morrison, 
Correspondence: No Reduction in Risk of a Massive Asteroid Impact, NATURE 421, 473 
(2003). 
 29. Ben J. Zimmerman & Bong Wie, Computational Validation of Nuclear Explosion 
Energy Coupling Models for Asteroid Fragmentation, AIAA/AAS ASTRODYNAMICS 
SPECIALIST CONF., AIAA SPACE Forum (AIAA 2014-4146) 1 (2014). 
 30. Id.; Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12; Owen B. Toon, Kevin J. Zahnle, David 
Morrison, Richard P. Turco & Curt Covey, Environmental Perturbations Caused by the 
Impacts of Asteroids and Comets, 35 REV. OF GEOPHYSICS 41, 74–75 (1997). 
 31. For discussion of some of the more notable recorded NEO impacts in recent human 
history, see Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 5; Weissman, supra note 12, at 1191–92. 
 32. Tony Philips, The Tunguska Impact – 100 Years Later, NASA SCI. NEWS,  
June 30, 2008, https://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2008/30jun_tunguska; 
Christopher F. Chyba, Paul J. Thomas & Kevin J. Zahnle, The 1908 Tunguska Explosion: 
Atmospheric Disruption of a Stony Asteroid, 361 NATURE 40 (1993). 
 33. Bill Napier & David Asher, The Tunguska Impact Event and Beyond, 50 
ASTRONOMY & GEOPHYSICS 1.18 (Feb. 1, 2009). 
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would be considered an NEO that was too small to qualify as a PHA,34 and 
despite not actually even impacting on Earth’s surface, the Tunguska NEO 
created an explosion of an estimated force of 10-20 megatons (TNT 
equivalent).35 Much more recently, the 2013 Chelyabinsk meteoroid impact 
in Russia36 injured over 1,000 people.37 Chelyabinsk was the first NEO 
impact event in recorded history to cause widespread injury to persons and 
damage to property.38  
It has been estimated (again, as an average) that major collisions such 
as Tunguska or Chelyabinsk—i.e., impacts that pose a lesser risk of harm 
than a civilization-ending collision, but still have the potential to be 
devastating—will occur once every 300 years.39 This represents a 
significantly greater risk than the appearance of a “planet killer.”   
As a purely statistical matter based on an average predicted annual 
death rate across the next million years, it has been argued that NEO 
impact poses roughly the same risk to the individual as does the yearly 
occurrence of accidental drowning or death by naturally occurring fires in 
the U.S. alone, and a greater risk than choking to death on food or from 
accidental firearm discharge.40 This said, the risk posed by NEO impact 
would, of course, involve a “bunched” death-tally resulting from a single 
impact, rather than being distributed relatively evenly each year, as are 
these other risks. Moreover, the fact that the occurrence of the next major 
NEO impact may be thousands of years in the future means the statistical 
risk takes on a notable level of abstraction when it comes to current human 
 
 34. See supra note 18. 
 35. Chyba, Thomas & Zahnle, supra note 32, at 40. 
 36. See, e.g., Ian Sample, Scientists Reveal the Full Power of the Chelyabinsk Meteor 
Explosion, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 7, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/ 
nov/06/chelyabinsk-meteor-russia; Ellen Barry & Andrew E. Kramer, Shock Wave of 
Fireball Meteor Rattles Siberia, Injuring 1,200, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, https://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/02/16/world/europe/meteorite-fragments-are-said-to-rain-down-on-siber 
ia.html?mcubz=3. 
 37. See Sample, supra note 36; Andrey Kuzmin, Meteorite Explodes over Russia, More 
than 1,000 Injured, REUTERS, Feb. 15, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-
meteorite-idUSBRE91E05Z20130215; Tom Parfitt, Russian Meteor Visits Shock and Awe 
on Chelyabinsk, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15, 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/scie 
nce/space/9873752/Russian-meteor-visits-shock-and-awe-on-Chelyabinsk.html. 
 38. See Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2. 
 39. V. V. Lebedev, Russia’s Preparedness to Protect the Earth Against Asteroid 
Hazards, 83 HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCI. 429, 429 (2013); Philips, supra note 
32; Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2. 
 40. Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 12–13. 
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decision-making.41 Equally, such an impact could occur significantly 
sooner.42 The risk posed by NEOs is small, but real.43 
 
III.  THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SHIFT TOWARDS PREPAREDNESS 
 
NEO impact risk had long been largely dismissed at the state level.44 
In 1995, NASA astrophysicist David Morrison famously asserted that 
“more people work a typical shift at one fast-food restaurant than scan the 
skies for near-Earth asteroids.”45 Morrison’s statement almost certainly was 
hyperbolic,46 but it nonetheless is indicative of the limited resource 
allocation in relation to NEO risk in the mid-1990s in the U.S.  
For decades NASA struggled to conduct NEO preparedness work 
because of the negligible budget that it was allocated.47 Indeed, while 
NASA was commissioned by the U.S. House of Representatives to initiate 
exploratory work on NEO response in 1990,48 it was not until 2005 that it 
received a mandate formally to begin developing plans for NEO 
interception (as opposed solely to identification/cataloguing).49 Such state-
level dismissal of NEO impact risk also was apparent outside of the U.S. 
 
 41. See generally Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSY’CAL SCI. 322 (2006) (discussing the divergence between statistical risk 
and perceived risk based on emotional response and experiential senses). 
 42. To take just one example, it recently was estimated by NASA that there is a 1 in 
2,700 probability of the large “Bennu” asteroid colliding with the Earth on Sept. 22, 2135. 
See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., There’s a Small Chance an Asteroid will Smack into Earth in 
2135. NASA is Working on a Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2018, https://www. washington 
post.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2018/03/19/theres-a-small-chance-an-asteroid-will-
smack-into-earth-in-2135-nasa-is-working-on-a-plan/?utm_term=.2fc0ac744aff. 
 43. See, e.g., Brian Kaplinger, Bong Wie & David Dearborn, Earth-Impact Modeling 
and Analysis of a Near-Earth Object Fragmented and Dispersed by Nuclear Subsurface 
Explosions, 59 J. ASTRON’L SCI. 103, 103 (2012). 
 44. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 240 (arguing, in 1997, that most of the work on the 
subject was being conducted by “ad hoc non governmental institutions”).  
 45. David Morrison, Target: Earth! 23 ASTRONOMY 34, 39 (1995). 
 46. Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 8–9, n.22. 
 47. See Thomas Mallon, The Asteroids Are Coming! The Asteroids Are Coming!, N.Y. 
TIMES MAGAZINE, July 28, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/28/magazine/the-aster 
oids-are-coming-the-asteroids-are-coming.html (describing the NASA budget in the 1990s 
as “under siege.”). 
 48. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 241. 
 49. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act 2005, 119 
Stat. 2895, Pub. L. 109–155, 109th Cong., §321, 4(c). 
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This can be illustrated by a statement made by the Australian Minister of 
Science on the 60 Minutes CBS television show in 2002: He asserted that 
Australia was “not going to be spooked or panicked into spending scarce 
research dollars on a fruitless attempt to predict the next asteroid . . .” and 
stressed that NEO impact represented “hype . . . and even fear-
mongering . . . .”50 
A similar degree of indifference was also evident at the inter-state 
level. In 1995, for example, noted NEO specialist Tom Gehrels made an 
impassioned plea at the first United Nations (UN) NEO conference in New 
York51 for the UN finally to take a meaningful role in the coordination of 
efforts to minimize the global risk of NEO impact.52 In 2004, Seamone 
noted in an article on NEO response, with a degree of exasperation, that 
there was no agency to take the lead on planetary defense at the 
international level, and no guidelines or framework to coordinate global 
NEO protection efforts.53 As recently as 2010, a major report on the subject 
by the University of Nebraska stressed that an international framework for 
dealing with the issue was “conspicuously missing.”54 
Having said this, the UN had at least begun to take note of the risk of 
NEO impact in the 1990s. Subsequent to the UN-organized NEO 
conference in 1995,55 the Third UN Conference on the Exploration and 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1999 formally recommended that the 
international coordination of activities related to NEOs be improved.56 That 
recommendation resulted in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS) establishing the Action Team on Near-Earth 
 
 50. Quoted in R. B. Adams, R. Alexander, J. Bonometti, J. Chapman, S. Fincher, R. 
Hopkins, M. Kalkstein & T. Polsgrove, Survey of Technologies Relevant to Defense from 
Near-Earth Objects, NATN’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. 14–15 (July 2004), https://ntrs. 
nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20050081838.pdf. 
 51. See John L. Remo, Policy Perspectives from the UN International Conference on 
Near-Earth Objects, 12 SPACE POL’Y 13 (1996). 
 52. Tom Gehrels, A Proposal to the United Nations Regarding the International 
Discovery Programs of Near-Earth Asteroids, 822 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCI. 603 
(1997).  
 53. Seamone, The Precautionary Principle, supra note 8, at 10. See also Brooks, supra 
note 12, 241. 
 54. Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 1. 
 55. Remo, supra note 51. 
 56. Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (Vienna, July 19-30, 1999) res. 1, ¶ (1)(c)(i), (ii), (iii), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.184/6 (Oct. 18, 1999). 
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Objects (“Action Team 14”) in 2001.57 Other inter-state institutions slowly 
had started to take note of the issue in the mid-1990s too: for example, in 
1996, the Council of Europe passed a resolution encouraging its member 
states to fund and engage in international NEO detection and response 
efforts.58 These early steps towards engaging with potential NEO impact at 
the inter-state level laid important groundwork, but were tentative and 
limited in themselves.  
The floodgates of global political will only truly have opened in the 
last five years, particularly following the 2013 Chelyabinsk impact. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Russia’s role in developing and implementing 
NEO preparedness strategies increased significantly as a result of 
Chelyabinsk.59 For example, various scientific centers and institutes in 
Russia have begun to undertake serious investigation into NEO response 
strategies since 2013,60 and in March 2017, a major NEO roundtable was 
convened by the Russian Federation Council.61  
Further, Russia’s newfound enthusiasm for the issue was evident in its 
significant involvement in the “NEOShield” project funded by the 
European Union (EU). The EU, for its part, had—for the first time—begun 
to divert substantial resources towards research on NEOs, bankrolling 
NEOShield to carry out detailed analysis of the various mitigation options 
for preventing impacts. NEOShield has run (in two iterations) since 2012.62  
 
 57. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
Sess., supp. no. 20, ¶¶ 44-61, U.N. Doc. A/56/20 (2001). 
 58. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on the Detection of 
Asteroids and Comets Potentially Dangerous to Humankind, SPACEGUARD FOUNDATION, 
Mar. 20, 1996, http://spaceguard.rm.iasf.cnr.it/SGF/resol.html.  
 59. See, e.g., Peter Fowler, PM Medvedev Says Russian Meteorite KEF-2013 Shows 
“Entire Planet” Vulnerable, NEWSROOM AMERICA, Feb. 15, 2013, https://www.newsroom 
america.com/story/347222/pm_medvedev_says_russian_meteorite_kef-2013_shows_entire_ 
planet_vulnerable_html (reporting that Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated on 
the day of the Chelyabinsk impact that it demonstrated that “the entire planet” was 
vulnerable to NEO impact, and that Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stressed that the 
international community needed to develop NEO impact preparedness strategies). 
 60. See Lebedev, supra note 39, at 433-44 (listing these various bodies). 
 61. See id. at 433. 
 62. See Former NEOShield Project, https://www.neoshield.eu/neoshield1-summary, for 
information on the first iteration that ran from 2012 to 2015 (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). See 
also The NEOShield-2: Science and Technology for Near-Earth Object Impact Prevention, 
https://www.neoshield.eu/science-technology-asteroid-impact, for the second iteration and 
current project, started in 2015 (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). The Russian state space agency 
was a key collaborating partner in the first iteration, see NEOShield Team, https://www. 
neoshield.eu/neoshield1-summary/neoshield-1-team (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). See also 
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Concurrent with these developments in Europe, President Obama’s 
second term in office saw the cementation of NEO impact risk as a 
meaningful element of U.S. national and international policy. This process 
had begun during the presidency of George W. Bush, who signed into law 
the 2005 NASA Authorization Act.63 Following the 2013 Chelyabinsk 
event, however, the Obama administration gave increased priority to the 
issue, culminating in the publication of the U.S. White House’s National 
Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy in December 2016.64 That 
document, produced by an inter-agency working group, for the first time 
set out a comprehensive U.S. plan for responding to an impending large-
scale NEO collision with Earth.65  
At the UN, stemming from its initial spark activity in the 1990s, 
investigation into NEO impact had been ongoing throughout the 2000s.66 
However, again it seemingly was the Chelyabinsk meteoroid (and the 
resulting increase in political will on the part of some of the organization’s 
most powerful member states), that provided the impetus for meaningful 
progress to be made at the UN. In particular, the increased efforts of 
COPUOS’s Working Group on Near-Earth Objects (which was originally 
constituted in 2007, and then reconvened each year up to and including 
2013)67 and Action Team 14,68 led to the creation of the International 
 
NEOShield-2: The Team, https://www.neoshield.eu/science-technology-asteroid-impact/dlr-
airbus-paris-surrey-aerospace (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (listing the collaborating partners 
for the second iteration).  
 63. NASA Authorization Act 2005, supra note 49. 
 64. National Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy, Interagency Working Group 
for Detecting and Mitigating the Impact of Earth-Bound Near-Earth Objects (NEOS) 
(DAMIEN) OF THE NATN’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL 5 (Dec. 2016), https://www.nasa. 
gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/national_near-earth_object_preparedness_strategy_tagged.pdf. 
 65. Id. 
 66. For example, the recommendation of the Third UN Conference on the Exploration 
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1999, led not only to the creation of Action Team 14 in 
2001 (supra note 57 and accompanying text), but also, later, to a year-long Working Group 
on Near-Earth Objects in 2007, which then was reconvened each year up to and including 
2013. See UNGA Res 61/111, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/111 (Jan. 15, 2007); G.A. Res 
62/217, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/217 (Feb. 1, 2008); G.A. Res 63/90, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/63/90 (Dec. 18, 2008); G.A. Res 64/86, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/86 (Jan. 13, 
2010); G.A. Res 65/97, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/97 (Jan. 20, 2011); UNGA Res 66/71, ¶ 7, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/71 (Jan. 12, 2012); G.A. Res 67/113, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/113 
(Jan. 14, 2013). Also of note is the second major UN-organized NEO response conference 
held in 2011 in Pasadena, California, see Asteroid Impact on Earth: Experts Review Global 
Response and Mitigation Steps, NEWSWISE (Aug. 30, 2011) https://www.newswise.com/ 
articles/view/580097/?sc=dwtr&xy=5028369. 
 67. See supra note 66. 
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Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) and the Space Mission Planning 
Advisory Group (SMPAG), which both formally were endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly in December 2013.69  
IAWN’s purpose is to coordinate international efforts to identify and 
track NEOs, and to link existing entities engaged in such work.70 SMPAG’s 
role also is to link and facilitate the cooperation of existing entities, 
including UN member states’ space agencies, but its terms of reference 
concern the development international responses to NEO impact risk.71 
Both IWAN and SMPAG thus are coordination bodies, rather than UN 
organs strictly speaking, but they nonetheless represent the emergence of a 
groundbreaking infrastructure. They are formally UN-mandated efforts to 
coordinate global data and management of NEO impact risk. The 2013 
creation of these bodies was a major turning point in UN leadership on the 
NEO issue.72  
The last five years thus have seen an unprecedented convergence of 
state political will and the creation of an (admittedly still embryonic) 
international institutional infrastructure.73 When these developments are 
 
 68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 69. G.A. Res. 68/75, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/75 (Dec. 16, 2013) (endorsing the 
proposals of the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, Report of the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee on its fiftieth session, held in Vienna from 11 to 22 February 
2013, particularly ¶¶ 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1038 (Mar. 7, 2013)). 
 70. Statement of Intent for Participation in the International Asteroid Warning 
Network, INTERNATIONAL ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK (IWAN) (Mar. 9, 2014), http:// 
iawn.net/documents/iawn_statement_of_intent.pdf. 
 71. Space Missions Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG), Terms of Reference for the 
Near-Earth Object Threat Mitigation Space Mission Planning Advisory Group, EUROPEAN 
SPACE AGENCY, https://www.cosmos.esa.int/web/smpag/terms-of-reference-v0 (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2018). 
 72. Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2. 
 73. Compare, e.g., the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), set up in 1988 by UNGA Res 43/53, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988) 
(which is the international body for assessing the science related to climate change), and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (entry into force Mar. 21, 
1994) 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (which acted as the first notable step in the development of 
structured international processes in relation to climate change, see Daniel Bodansky, The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 451, 558 (1993)). The creation of the IPCC and the adoption of the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change occurred, respectively, 16 years and 20 years after the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972) U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.1 (see, in particular, Recommendation 70) had meaningfully 
placed climate change on the international agenda (see Richard Black, Stockholm: Birth of 
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combined with concurrent advancements in science and technology,74 it 
may be said that that humanity’s potential to detect and, if necessary, 
respond to collision-course NEOs now is at a level that likely would have 
been considered implausible even at the start of the current decade. 
 
IV.  THE MEANS OF RESPONSE AND SUPPORT FOR THE  
“NUCLEAR OPTION” 
 
More than ever before, the increased global capacity to respond to 
potentially harmful NEOs triggers the question of which method(s) of 
response humanity might seek to employ, should a collision-course NEO 
be detected.  
 
A.  Diversion vs. Destruction 
 
Any approach to preventing NEO impact will need to 1) deflect/divert 
the NEO; or 2) destroy it.75 It is evident that “[a]mong researchers in this 
field, the current accepted plan is to change the course of an asteroid as it 
approaches the Earth, not to blow it up.”76 This preference for “diversion” 
in the scientific community is because of the significantly greater kinetic 
 
the Green Generation, BBC NEWS, June 4, 2012, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-
environment-18315205). 
 74. See National Research Council, DEFENDING PLANET EARTH: NEAR-EARTH-OBJECT 
SURVEYS AND HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES 29–50 (2010); Josep M. Trigo-Rodríguez, 
Herbert Palme & Maria Gritsevich, Barcelona Asteroid Day 2015: Revisiting the Threat by 
Asteroid and Comet Impact, in ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION OF ASTEROID IMPACT 
HAZARDS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 BARCELONA ASTEROID DAY 1, 2 (Josep M. Trigo-
Rodríguez, Maria Gritsevich & Herbert Palme eds., 2017); G. B. Valsecchi & A. Milani 
Comparetti, Evaluating the Risk of Impacts and the Efficiency of Risk Reduction, in 
COMET/ASTEROID IMPACTS AND HUMAN SOCIETY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 202, 
208 (Peter T. Bobrowsky and Hans Rickman eds., 2007); Legal Aspects of NEO Threat 
Response, supra note 8, at 4; Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, 
at 2. 
 75. See Thomas J. Ahrens & Alan W. Harris, Deflection and Fragmentation of Near-
Earth Asteroids, 360 NATURE 429 (1992); Sweet, supra note 12, at 224; Kunich, supra note 
12, at 128. 
 76. John Basart & Bong Wie, Mitigation of Asteroid Impact Threats, 28 IEEE 
POTENTIALS 10, 11 (2009). 
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force required for,77 and the possibility of dangerous debris resulting 
from,78 approaches that would involve the destruction of an NEO.  
It is worth noting, however, that diversion may not be possible in late-
warning cases. If an NEO was already close to impact when spotted, the 
time required to alter its course enough for it to miss Earth may mean that 
destruction became the only viable option.79  
 
B.  “Off-World” vs. “On-World” Approaches 
 
Some NEO response experts have argued that any NEO diversion 
mission would be more likely to succeed if the interceptor were to be 
already stationed in outer space (what may be called an “off-world” 
approach), rather than it being launched at the NEO from the surface of the 
Earth (an “on-world” approach).80 These experts reason that an interceptor 
launched from Earth may not reach the NEO in time,81 or at least that a 
response initiated from Earth may allow time only for one attempt to divert 
the NEO, whereas interception from within space would be more likely to 
offer opportunities for multiple/cumulative interception attempts, 
increasing the chances of success.82  
However, such conclusions have been contested. Other NEO response 
experts have argued that, depending on the circumstances, diversion may 
still be possible by means of a specially designed terrestrially-launched 
 
 77. V. S. Sazonov & M. V. Yakovlev, Explosion Method of Preventing Collisions of 
Asteroid-Comet Bodies with the Earth in the Case of their Late Detection, 79 J. 
ENGINEERING PHYSICS & THERMOPHYSICS 476, 476 (2006). 
 78. Basart & Wie, supra note 76, at 11. 
 79. See Megan Bruck Syal, David S.P. Dearborn & Peter H. Schultz, Limits on the Use 
of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection, 90 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 103, 103–04 
(2013); J. Sanchez, M. Vasile & G. Radice, On the Consequences of a Fragmentation Due 
to a NEO Mitigation Strategy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IAC-08-C1.3.10, 59TH 
INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS, Strathprints version, 3–4 (2008); S. 
Konyukhov & N. Slyunyayev, Conception of the Creation of Space Rocket Complex as 
Necessary Link for Anti-Asteroid Protection of the Earth, 50 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 629, 630 
(2002). 
 80. Claudio Maccone, Planetary Defense from Space: Part 1 – Keplerian Theory, 55 
ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 99 (2004); Claudio Maccone, Planetary Defense from Space: Part 2 
(Simple) Asteroid Deflection Law, 58 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 662 (2006); Mark Bucknam & 
Robert Gold, Asteroid Threat? The Problem of Planetary Defence, 50 SURVIVAL 141, 149 
(2008). 
 81. Bucknam & Gold, supra note 80, at 149. 
 82. Maccone, Planetary Defense from Space: Part 1, supra note 80, at 992; Maccone, 
Planetary Defense from Space: Part 2, supra note 80, at 663. 
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rocket,83 or even that existing “on-world” missile systems could be 
employed to produce the desired effect.84 
 
C. The Desirability of, and Steps Towards, Testing Possible  
 Responses 
 
Whatever NEO response measure might ultimately be employed, 
some scientific experts have stressed that it is highly desirable that any 
measures of NEO response are tested, not merely simulated, including by 
employing them against actual NEOs that are not on a collision course with 
Earth.85 Stepping beyond computer simulations,86 practical tests would 
allow for data collection to better determine the suitability of any given 
measure, predict the chances of success and optimal application, as well as 
highlight risks and environmental implications. Such data could be crucial 
for decision-making and resource allocation prior to the actual appearance 
of a collision-course NEO (where time may be a crucial factor, and where 
the use of an untested approach may increase the risk of the response 
failing or causing unintended harm).87  
As part of the recent general movement in the global political climate 
towards NEO preparedness, notable steps have been taken to test 
humanity’s response capability in concrete settings. For example, in 
October 2017, NASA, IWAN and other agencies conducted various (non-
kinetic88) preparedness and response tests on asteroid “TC4,” as it passed 
 
 83. See, e.g., Konyukhov & Slyunyayev, supra note 79. 
 84. Kunich, supra note 12, at 128. 
 85. See, e.g., Bucknam & Gold, supra note 80, at 152 (making this argument 
specifically with regard to nuclear options); Basart & Wie, supra note 76, at 12; Sweet, 
supra note 12, at 228; Weissman, supra note 12, at 1207; Seamone, The Duty to “Expect the 
Unexpected”, supra note 8, at 791-93. 
 86. See generally Nahum Melamed, Development of a Handbook and an On-Line Tool 
on Defending Earth against Potentially Hazardous Objects, 90 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 165 
(2013); Brian Kaplinger, Bong Wie & David Dearborn, Nuclear Fragmentation/Dispersion 
Modeling and Simulation of Hazardous Near-Earth Objects, 90 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 156 
(2013). 
 87. See generally A. F. Cheng, J. Atchison, B. Kantsiper, A. S. Rivkin, A. Stickle, C. 
Reed, A. Galvez, I. Carnelli, P. Michel & S. Ulamec, Asteroid Impact and Deflection 
Assessment Mission, 115 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 262 (2015) (discussing the benefits of 
practically testing diversion methods). 
 88. See infra note 93 and accompanying text (giving a brief overview of some of the 
various proposed methods, both kinetic and non-kinetic). 
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by Earth at a distance of around 26,000 miles.89 Even more significant is 
the Asteroid Impact and Deflection Assessment (AIDA) mission, initiated 
in 2015, which is a collaborative endeavor of the European Space Agency, 
NASA, Observatoire de la Côte d’Azur, and the Johns Hopkins University 
Applied Physics Laboratory.90 AIDA will involve two separate launches, 
scheduled for October and December 2020 (with rendezvous predictions of 
May and October 2022, respectively).91 These missions will constitute the 
first “real-world” (or, more accurately, “real-solar system”) testing of a 
(non-nuclear) kinetic impact diversion technique, by attempting to ram and 
thus deflect the 800m “Didymos” asteroid.92  
 
D.  Scientific Support for Nuclear Approaches 
 
Turning to the potential options themselves for NEO diversion (and, 
for cases where diversion would be impossible, destruction), various 
possible methods have been proposed, including a wide range of non-
nuclear options. These non-nuclear proposals include “kinetic impact” (i.e., 
ramming the NEO, which is what the AIDA mission is seeking to test), the 
use of lasers, gravitational “tug boats” to drag the NEO (what are 
sometimes called “gravity tractors”), gravity “sling shots,” and harnessing 
solar energy to super-heat the asteroid’s surface.93  
Crucially, however, “in recent years, advocates of the use of nuclear 
weapons . . . have been gaining ground.”94 Many experts in relevant fields 
increasingly argue that nuclear explosive technology represents the most 
effective, and perhaps in certain situations the only, option humanity may 
have for responding to extreme NEO impact scenarios. In March 2007, for 
 
 89. See Jet Propulsion Laboratory, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
This is a Test: Asteroid Tracking Network Observes Close Approach, Oct. 10, 2017, https:// 
www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/news.php?feature=6969. 
 90. See Asteroid Impact and Deflection Assessment (AIDA) Mission, NATN’L 
AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/aida. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; Cheng et al., supra note 87, at 262. 
 93. For discussion of proposed non-nuclear options, see Joseph Packer, Jeffrey A. Kurr 
& Adam Abelkop, The Policy Trajectory of United States Asteroid Deflection Planning, 1 
TIMELY INTERVENTIONS: TRANSNAT’L J. PUB. POL’Y DEBATE 1, 4 (2013); H. J. Melosh, I. V. 
Nemchinov & Yu I. Zetzer, Non-Nuclear Strategies for Deflecting Comets and Asteroids, in 
HAZARDS DUE TO ASTEROIDS AND COMETS 1111 (Tom Gehrels ed. 1994). 
 94. Douglas Birch, The Plans to Use Nuclear Weapons to Blow up Incoming Asteroids, 
ATLANTIC, Oct. 16, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-
plans-to-use-nuclear-weapons-to-blow-up-incoming-asteroids/280593. 
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example, NASA delivered a report to the U.S. Congress setting out the 
findings of an extensive survey of alternatives; a key conclusion in that 
report was that “[n]uclear standoff explosions [i.e., explosions near to an 
NEO as a means of diverting it] are assessed to be 10-100 times more 
effective than . . . non-nuclear alternatives.”95 Given the likelihood of any 
NEO interception mission being both time and resource96 constrained, 
nuclear devices also represent by far the most mass-efficient means of 
transporting large amounts of energy across long distances.97 
Those who support the use of nuclear explosions for planetary defense 
do not argue that they will be suitable in all circumstances,98 stressing that 
this approach should be reserved as a last resort in extreme cases.99 For 
some potentially hazardous NEOs, non-nuclear options will be 
scientifically preferable (leaving aside, at this juncture, questions of politics 
and law).100 However, nuclear explosions particularly have been supported 
in relation to two circumstances: where the NEO is 1) especially large; or 
2) especially close.101  
Where the NEO is especially large, it has been claimed that diverting 
(or perhaps destroying) it by non-nuclear means is likely to be extremely 
difficult or impossible given the level of kinetic energy required. Writing in 
the hugely influential journal Nature in 1992, Ahrens and Harris concluded 
that “for larger objects [NEOs in the 1–10km diameter range] nuclear 
explosions seem to be the only practical means of deflection.”102 More than 
20 years later, in 2013, Syal et al. made the same assertion: “At present, 
 
 95. Center for Near Earth Object Studies, Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection 
Analysis of Alternatives: Report to Congress, NATN’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. 2 
(March 2007) (emphasis added). See also Bong Wie, Hypervelocity Nuclear Interceptors for 
Asteroid Disruption, 90 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 146, 151 (2013) (“… a nuclear explosion is 
much more effective than any other non-nuclear alternative …”). 
 96. Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, 33 (noting that cost is “a 
major aspect of … NEO mitigation campaigns …”). 
 97. Id.; National Research Council, supra note 74, 76; YEOMANS, supra note 3, at 146. 
 98. See generally Kaplinger, Wie & Dearborn, supra note 43, at 104. 
 99. See, e.g., National Research Council, supra note 74, particularly 4, 79; Packer, 
Kurr, & Abelkop, supra note 93, at 2; YEOMANS, supra note 3, at 148; Legal Aspects of 
NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 25. 
 100. See Megan Bruck Syal, J. Michael Owen & Paul L. Miller, Deflection by Kinetic 
Impact: Sensitivity to Asteroid Properties, 269 ICARUS 50 (2016) (specifically discussing 
kinetic non-nuclear approaches). 
 101. See, e.g., National Research Council, supra note 74, 78; Bucknam & Gold, supra 
note 80, at 149; Wie, supra note 95, at 151; Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra 
note 8, at 25. 
 102. Ahrens & Harris, supra note 75, at 429 (emphasis added). 
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nuclear munitions are the only available technology capable of deflecting 
large bodies [NEOs exceeding 500m in diameter].”103  
Similarly, a nuclear approach has been said to be necessary in cases 
where the NEO is especially close to Earth when it is detected.104 It has 
been argued that all of the proposed non-nuclear methods would require a 
substantial lead time (over 10 years, and in some cases much longer),105 or 
at least that non-nuclear methods involving “low energy” 
diversion/destruction of a “close” NEO would create significant amounts of 
potentially harmful debris.106 Whereas it has been argued that the “high 
energy” use of nuclear explosions “may substantially reduce the amount of 
mass remaining on impact trajectories”107 and could be employed in a much 
shorter timeframe.108 
 
E.  State-Level Support for Nuclear Approaches 
 
Reflecting what now seemingly is the majority view in the scientific 
research, states (at least the major players) have focused particularly on 
developing nuclear methods of NEO diversion over the last five to ten 
years. In the U.S., NASA has begun to receive heavy investment for 
research into nuclear approaches, and a series of big-money grants have 
been awarded to researchers at American universities and institutes to fund 
parallel work.109 Russia has also increased its focus on the nuclear option. 
From 2012-2015, for example, Russia’s federal space agency led the strand 
of the EU-funded NEOShield project110 that was aimed specifically at 
further developing viable nuclear explosive ways of diverting large 
NEOs.111  
 
 103. Syal, Dearborn & Schultz, supra note 79, at 103 (emphasis added). See also Gerrard 
& Barber, supra note 12, at 10; Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 
12, at 2; Brooks, supra note 12, at 242, 246; National Research Council, supra note 74, 79. 
 104. See, e.g., National Research Council, supra note 74, at 76. 
 105. Wie, supra note 95, at 146. 
 106. Sanchez, Vasile & Radice, supra note 79. 
 107. Kaplinger, Wie & Dearborn, supra note 86, at 156. 
 108. Id. at 156 (“This method could be available with as little as 10 days of lead time 
between intercept and the predicted impact date.”). 
 109. Birch, supra note 94. 
 110. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 111. Roland Oliphant, EU, Russia may Nuke Asteroids, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 17, 2016, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12103720/EU-Russia-may-
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Of especial note is the fact that the U.S. and Russia have explored the 
possibility of collaborating on nuclear approaches to NEO response. In 
2013, the two states concluded a wide-ranging, open-ended nuclear 
cooperation agreement,112 and, while that agreement did not explicitly 
reference nuclear planetary defense, the accompanying release statement 
from the U.S. Department of Energy confirmed that a key project 
envisaged as falling under the auspices of Article III of the agreement was 
for the U.S. and Russia to work together on “defense from asteroids” by 
nuclear means.113 The 2013 agreement was suspended by Russia in 2016 
due to increased tensions between the states (primarily in relation to 
Crimea).114 Nonetheless, given the shared history of the U.S. and Russia 
when it comes to nuclear weapons, the very fact that they seriously have 
explored the possibility of collaborating on nuclear planetary defense 
initiatives, to the point of taking steps to formalize this as an aspect of a 
cooperative agreement, shows how prominent the nuclear approach to NEO 
response has become for both states. 
At the global institutional level too, it is notable that the new UN-
mandated body SMPAG listed, in its October 2016 work plan, the “study 
of the nuclear device option” as a key future activity for the group. Indeed, 
from a review of the full work plan, this is an activity that seems to have 
been given rather more prominence on SMPAG’s agenda than parallel 
work relating to non-nuclear alternatives.115 
 
nuke-asteroids.html (citing a press release from Russia’s federal space agency); John Hall, 
Nuclear Weapons Could be Used to Blow Up Asteroids if They Threaten the Earth, 
Scientists Reveal, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, Jan. 17, 2016, https://www.ibtimes. 
co.uk/nuclear-weapons-could-be-used-blow-asteroids-if-they-threaten-earth-scientists-reve 
al-1538425.  
 112. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Nuclear- and Energy-Related 
Scientific Research and Development (United States-Russia Nuclear Research Agreement) 
(2013), http://fissilematerials.org/library/u-s-department-of-energy-agreement-with-rosatom. 
pdf.  
 113. United States, Russia Sign Agreement to Further Research and Development 
Collaboration in Nuclear Energy and Security, United States Department of Energy, Sept. 
16, 2013, https://energy.gov/articles/united-states-russia-sign-agreement-further-research-
and-development-collaboration-nuclear. 
 114. See Suspending the Russian-US Agreement on Cooperation in Nuclear- and 
Energy-Related Scientific Research and Development, The Russian Government, 
Government Decisions, Orders and Directives, Oct. 5, 2016, http://special.government. 
ru/en/docs/24766. 
 115. U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Mission Planning Advisory Group, 
Work Plan, Document No. SMPAG—PL-001/1.2, 19–20 (Oct. 2016). 
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Overall, nuclear options clearly have received significant increased 
support, in relation at least to the most extreme NEO threat scenarios, 
across the research community, some of the major state players, and at the 
inter-state level. Not only is NEO preparedness now truly on the global 
agenda for the first time, but the nuclear method of implementing it in 
particular is too. 
 
V.  REASONS TO OPPOSE THE “NUCLEAR OPTION” 
 
A. Scientific Opposition 
 
It is important to note that there remains dissent amongst experts in 
NEO response as to the desirability of the nuclear approach. Scientists 
continue to develop possible non-nuclear approaches, and, in so doing, at 
least some explicitly eschew the use of nuclear devices.116 In part, this 
competing stance is rooted in genuine differences of scientific opinion as to 
the efficacy of nuclear approaches and the avowed inefficacy of non-
nuclear options in relation to particular NEO impact scenarios.  
For example, it has been argued that the porous nature of some NEOs 
indicate that they will be more resistant to measures involving the direct 
application of kinetic energy than commonly is supposed, and therefore 
other methods (such as gravity-related sling shot techniques) will have a 
higher chance of success.117 In contrast to those arguing that a nuclear blast 
would lessen the risk of harmful fragments raining down on Earth,118 others 
have stressed that the risk of debris in fact would be increased by the 
destructive force of a nuclear explosion, leading to more harm than would 
have occurred had a non-nuclear method been employed.119  
Such disagreements demonstrate that the scientific preference for 
nuclear methods certainly is not universal. However, even leaving aside 
differences of opinion over the science and questions of resulting efficacy, 
 
 116. See, e.g., Mohammad J. Mashayekhi & Arun K. Misra, Effect of the Finite Size of 
an Asteroid on its Deflection Using a Tether–Ballast System, 125 CELEST MECH DYN ASTR 
363, 364–65 (2016); Jesse D. Koenig & Christopher F. Chyba, Impact Deflection of 
Potentially Hazardous Asteroids Using Current Launch Vehicles, 15 SCI. & GLOBAL SEC. 57 
(2007). 
 117. See, e.g., Syal, Owen & Miller, supra note 100, at 54-55; Packer, Kurr & Abelkop, 
supra note 93, at 4. 
 118. See Sanchez, Vasile & Radice, supra note 79. 
 119. See, e.g., Mashayekhi & Misra, supra note 116, at 364–65; Packer, Kurr & 
Abelkop, supra note 93, at 4. 
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it is clear that the competing trend in the research community towards non-
nuclear options also stems from wider political and social concerns related 
to nuclear armaments.120  
 
B. “PNEs” and Nuclear Weapons 
 
The use of a nuclear explosive device as a means of NEO response 
might arguably fall under the category of nuclear activity that has 
sometimes been referred to as “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions” (PNEs). In 
the early decades of the nuclear age, the U.S.121 and the Soviet Union122 
exploded around 150 nuclear devices for peaceful civil and industrial 
purposes. However, while potentially useful as a descriptor of underpinning 
intent, the notion of a “PNE” is an illusory one in practice because, 
technologically, PNEs are identical to the testing or use of nuclear weapons 
(in terms of both the act and the results of that act).123 This most vividly can 
be illustrated by India’s 1974 Pokhran-I tests, which India described at the 
 
 120. See, e.g., Mohammad J. Mashayekhi & Arun K. Misra, Tether Assisted Near Earth 
Object Diversion, 75 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 71, 71 (2012); Melosh, Nemchinov & Zetzer, 
supra note 93, at 1130; Maccone, Planetary Defense from Space: Part 2, supra note 80, at 
670. 
 121. See Jozef Goldblat, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Régime: Assessment and 
Prospects, 256 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 48 (1995) (noting that the U.S. carried out 27 PNEs 
between 1961 and 1973). For an overview of the U.S. PNE program, see SCOTT KAUFMAN, 
PROJECT PLOWSHARE: THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES IN COLD WAR AMERICA 
(2012). 
 122. See Milo D. Nordyke, The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Explosions, 7 SCI. & GLOBAL SEC. 1 (1998) (giving an overview of the Soviet Union’s PNE 
program, which ran from 1965 to 1988, and, at 11, noting that during this period there were 
122 Soviet PNEs). 
 123. See Robert D. Bartels, The Nonproliferation Treaty and Peaceful Applications of 
Nuclear Explosions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1030, 1030–31, 1041–43 (1968); Nils-Olov Bergkvist 
& Ragnhild Ferm, Nuclear Explosions 1945–1998, FOA Defence Research Establishment, 
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE user rept., 6 (2000); Pop, supra 
note 12, at 675. This fact also has been stressed by states, see, e.g., Letter dated Apr. 10, 
1995 from the Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
addressed to the Prov. Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of 
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, Apr. 17 
– May 12, 1995), 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.1995/17 (Apr. 14, 1995) (the United 
States, stating, 22 years after the last American PNE, that it “regards such explosions 
[PNEs] as indistinguishable from military tests.”).  
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time as PNEs.124 Despite India’s assertions of peaceful use, the Pokhran-I 
tests were widely considered to amount to the testing of nuclear 
weapons,125 signaling India’s de facto entry into the “nuclear weapons 
club.”  
The risk of states hiding behind avowed “peaceful use” to develop, 
test or use nuclear weapons—coupled with fears over the environmental 
harm that can be caused even by genuinely “peaceful” nuclear 
explosions—led to PNEs becoming politically unacceptable in the 1970s 
and 1980s.126 The use of PNEs correspondingly declined, with no such 
explosions having occurred—or at least having been declared and 
verified—since the last Soviet PNE in 1988.127 As a concept rooted in the 
first four decades of the nuclear age, the “PNE” has been inherently 
associated with terrestrial civil engineering activities. Nonetheless, the 
modern unacceptability of PNEs in such contexts usefully acts to highlight 
a key problem with proposed nuclear approaches to NEOs today.  
In effect, the nuclear option for NEO response is, irrespective of 
intent, a proposal to use nuclear weapons in space. This clearly denotes the 
retention and possibly even further development128 of nuclear weapons on 
Earth, and the consequent possibility of them being used for other, 
aggressive purposes, including in space. The nuclear approach to planetary 
defense engages a range of concerns that stretch well beyond the scientific.  
 
 
 
 
 
 124. See P.R. Chari, Pokharan-I: Personal Reflections, 80 INSTITUTE OF PEACE & 
CONFLICT STUDIES, Special Report (1999), http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR80-Chari-
Final.pdf. 
 125. See MARIO CARRANZA, SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 
ORDER: CREATING A ROBUST INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REGIME 44 (2009). 
See also Christer Ahlström, Arrows for India? – Technology Transfers of Ballistic Missile 
Defence and the Missile Technology Control Regime, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 103, 119 
(2004) (describing the Pokhran-I tests as being “allegedly peaceful.”). 
 126. JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND 
AGREEMENTS 55 (2d ed., 2002). 
 127. Id. See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH, Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) 3 CONSOLIDATING 
PEACEFUL REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAS 333 (1992) (“The last peaceful nuclear explosion 
announced by the Soviet Union was in 1988.”). 
 128. See Bucknam & Gold, supra note 80, 153 (suggesting that NEO preparedness may 
require new underground nuclear testing to perfect the devices required). 
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C.  Developments in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the  
 De-Militarization of Space 
 
Simultaneous with the rise in global preparedness in relation to NEO 
impact risk, and in support for nuclear responses to it in particular, there 
has been startling progress in the international nuclear disarmament 
movement in recent years. Although its roots stretch back further,129 a 
significant change may be said to have begun with the widespread state 
support at the 2010 review conference130 of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)131 for a new treaty banning 
nuclear weapons outright.132  
With astonishing speed, this proposal culminated in the adoption of 
the final text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW)133 on July 7, 2017, with the treaty opening for signature on 
September 20, 2017. The TPNW for the first time provides for a 
comprehensive legal prohibition on the development, possession and use of 
nuclear weapons.134 It can be seen as representing a generational high-water 
mark for nuclear disarmament.135 Of the 120 states that debated the final 
 
 129. Such as to the creation, in 2007, of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons (ICAN), https://www.icanw.org/, or the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 
2008 “5-point plan” for nuclear disarmament: Secretary-General’s address to the East-West 
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Nuclear Weapons (NPT), May 3–28, 2010, https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010. 
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2010, TOWARDS NUCLEAR ABOLITION (Report by the International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons, June 2010). 
 133. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 2017, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.229/2017/8 (July 6, 2017) [CN.475.2017.TREATIES-XXVI-9, Aug. 9, 2017 
(opening for signature); CN.476.2017.TREATIES-XXVI-9, Aug. 9, 2017 (issuance of 
certified true copies)]. 
 134. Id., particularly art. 1. 
 135. Daniel Joyner, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, EJIL: TALK!, 
July 26, 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons 
(“… we are witnessing a generational event of significance …”). ICAN was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to secure the adoption of the TPNW text. See Anti-Nuclear 
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text, only one voted against it (the Netherlands) and only one abstained 
(Singapore); as of September 5, 2018, the TPNW already has 60 signatories 
and 14 ratifications.136  
Equally, 63 UN member states—including, crucially, all the nuclear 
powers—were not represented at the debates on the TPNW’s final text at 
all: one must not overstate the impact of the TPNW’s adoption. Currently, 
the treaty has limited potential legal implications,137 as the treaty is not yet 
in force138 and does not have the support of any of the nuclear states.139 It is 
possible that the TPNW may struggle ever to have meaningful legal reach, 
even in terms of influencing customary international law development.140  
While the possible legal implications of the TPNW for nuclear NEO 
response, were it to enter into force, will be considered in subsection V.D, 
it is important to stress at this juncture that the political implications of the 
TPNW’s adoption are both undeniable and immediate.141 Abandoning the 
piecemeal approaches of the previous law, the TPNW prohibits the 
possession and use of nuclear weapons in toto. At the very least, it thus 
represents an unprecedented statement of intent on the part of the 120 UN 
member states that voted for its adoption, placing notable pressure on the 
nuclear powers.142 This speaks volumes as to the political tensions that 
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 136. For the status of the TPNW, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter 9: 
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Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=_en.  
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NATO REV. MAG., May 19, 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/ 
nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-scepticism-abolition/EN/index.htm (critiquing the TPNW’s 
legal potential). 
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 139. See Beatrice Fihn, The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons, 59 SURVIVAL 43, 45 
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and Beyond, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (September 2017), http://www.armscontrol.org/ 
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nuclear-ban-treaty-customary-law. 
 141. See Joyner, supra note 135. 
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would be triggered by any planetary defense efforts that were to feature the 
use of nuclear explosions. 
Similarly, there have been parallel—if less well publicized—
developments in the movement to ensure the complete non-militarization of 
outer space.143 Most notably, the 2014 Draft Treaty on Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force 
against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)144 aims for the first time categorically 
to prohibit the placement of any weapons whatsoever in outer space.145 The 
PPWT’s legal implications are even further down the “potential” pipeline 
at the present time than is the case for the TPNW. It is a draft treaty that is 
not in force, is not open for signature, has not yet had its text adopted, and 
has faced notable opposition from certain states.146 Over the last year, 
however, some states have made very clear their desire for the draft PPWT 
to be adopted,147 suggesting that it may be gaining increased traction in the 
international community.  
 
 143. See generally United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Conference on 
Disarmament Documents Related to Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (last 
updated Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/cd/documents-related-to-
prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space (particularly documents from the mid-2000s 
onwards). 
 144. Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT 2014) 2014, annexed to Letter 
dated June 10 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation and the Permanent 
Rep. of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the acting Secretary-General 
of the Conference transmitting the updated Russian and Chinese texts of the draft treaty on 
prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force 
against outer space objects (PPWT) introduced by the Russian Federation and China, 
CD/1985 (June 12, 2014). The 2014 draft treaty was updated from a previous version from 
2008. See Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of 
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT 2008) 2008, annexed to 
Letter dated Feb. 12 2008 from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation and the 
Permanent Rep. of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-
General of the Conference transmitting the Russian and Chinese texts of the draft treaty on 
prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force 
against outer space objects (PPWT) introduced by the Russian Federation and China, 
CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008).  
 145. PPWT 2014, supra note 144, preamble. 
 146. See, e.g., Amid Commemoration of Landmark Treaty’s Fiftieth Anniversary, Joint 
Meeting of First, Fourth Committees Discusses Keeping Weapons Away from Outer Space, 
U.N. G.A., 4th Com., Press Release, 72nd Sess., 11th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/SPD/640, Oct. 
12, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gaspd640.doc.htm (Jessica West, noting that 
there exist “sharp divisions” amongst states over the PPWT). 
 147. See, e.g., id. (Venezuela); Anniversaries of Sputnik I Launch, Milestone Treaty’s 
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It is perhaps unlikely that the draft PPWT will be adopted in its 
current form, although a revision of the text to facilitate consensus remains 
a possibility. The legal implications of the PPWT (as the current draft 
stands) for nuclear NEO responses, were it to be adopted and entered into 
force, briefly will be explored in subsection V.E. At the very least, it is 
important to note that states’ serious consideration of a treaty outlawing 
any and all weapons in space, and the clear support for it by a significant 
number of them, could be of notable political significance for the 
possibility of nuclear planetary defense. 
 
D. “Asteroids” as a Pretext: A Question of Competing Risks 
 
It might be speculated that the increased support for and investigation 
into nuclear approaches to NEO response at the state-level is driven not (or 
not solely) by a desire to ensure effective planetary protection. It also may 
stem from the fact that the notion of “asteroid threat” acts to clothe the 
continued possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of states in the robes 
of altruism,148 precisely at a time when the global political climate is one of 
increasing pressure on them to relinquish such armaments. For states that 
want neither to give up their nuclear weapons nor suffer the political fallout 
that their continued failure to disarm may entail, the need to retain nuclear 
weapons to protect the planet represents a convenient narrative.  
Indeed, one might question whether the (undoubtedly low) risk of 
catastrophic harm caused by NEO impact outweighs the (perhaps rather 
more likely) risk of a catastrophic use of nuclear weapons on Earth,149 or 
even the aggressive use of a nuclear arsenal that had been deployed in 
 
2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gaspd639.doc.htm (Venezuela); Do Not Let 
Political Differences Distract You, General Assembly President Urges Member States, as 
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Sess., 12th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/SPD/641, Oct. 13, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/ 
2017/gaspd641.doc.htm (Cuba). 
 148. In 1996, for example, China claimed that it was necessary for it to continue to 
undertake underground nuclear tests so that it would be ready to respond to an NEO if 
necessary, and refused to engage with certain non-proliferation agreements on that basis. 
The international community viewed this claim as a smoke screen for military nuclear 
development. See Patrick E. Tyler, Chinese Seek Atom Option to Fend Off Asteroids, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/27/world/chinese-seek-atom-opti 
on-to-fend-off-asteroids.html; William J. Broad, For Killer Asteroids, Respect at Last, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/14/science/for-killer-asteroids-res 
pect-at-last.html; Brooks, supra note 12, at 250; Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 18. 
 149. Sweet, supra note 12, at 224. 
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space.150 Even if a nuclear weapon was used genuinely and solely to divert 
an NEO, this still would entail significant environmental risks, as is the 
case with any nuclear detonation.151 It can be reasonably argued that 
humanity may be better served by responding to the threat posed by the 
existence and use of nuclear weapons rather than that posed by a 
hypothetical asteroid. 
Such questions as to the desirability of the nuclear approach are 
crucial and must be kept in mind, but one also must be realistic. Complete 
nuclear disarmament is not going to occur any time soon, and the foregoing 
sections have indicated that if a collision-course NEO is identified, 
humanity now is significantly more likely to respond to that threat by 
nuclear means than ever has been the case before. The genuine possibility 
of nuclear planetary defense means that a wide range of issues must be 
examined. The remainder of this article assesses just one of them: the legal 
implications of nuclear NEO response.  
 
VI.  RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS IN TREATY LAW 
 
In 1996, John Remo, who was the chair of the first UN conference on 
NEOs in 1995, commented that “[i]nternational law and practice does not 
address [the issue of NEO impact] . . . directly.”152 This statement remains 
true today. There are no treaties that relate specifically to responses to 
impending NEO impact,153 nor have any “NEO response norms” developed 
in customary international law.154 Similarly, in the wider context of 
international law’s nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 1968 NPT155—a 
treaty that is often said to represent the “cornerstone” of that regime156—
notably does not prohibit the use of PNEs; indeed, it deliberately left room 
 
 150. Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, 16, at 19–20. 
 151. Id. at 19, 25; Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 40. 
 152. Remo, supra note 51, 17. See also Tronchetti, supra note 12, at 1027–28, 1036. 
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 154. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 243. 
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for the American and Soviet PNE programs that existed157 at the time of its 
drafting.158 
However, this lack of bespoke law on NEO impact (and the non-
existence of a PNE prohibition in the most crucial nuclear non-proliferation 
law treaty) does not mean that an act of nuclear planetary defense would 
exist in a legal vacuum.159 This section examines relevant restrictions or 
prohibitions that exist in binding treaty law, as well as in the form of “soft 
law” (in treaties that are not in force). 
Both in the (limited) scholarly literature160 and the wider media,161 a 
pervading conception, albeit not entirely unquestioned,162 is that existing 
international law would outright prohibit the use of nuclear explosions to 
divert or destroy an NEO. This view probably is correct, but the 
unlawfulness of nuclear planetary defense is not as clear as some have 
suggested. Moreover, as will be explored in section VI, there remain 
various possible legal means of precluding that apparent unlawfulness that 
require assessment. The current legal status of nuclear NEO response is 
both complex and uncertain. 
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(Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1995) (arguing that it has long been unquestionable that there 
is no “legal vacuum” in outer space, irrespective of recurring claims to the contrary); Pop, 
supra note 12, 659–60. 
 160. See, e.g., Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 3, 28; Su, 
Control Over Activities Harmful to the Environment, supra note 12, at 85; Su, Measures 
Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2; Weissman, supra note 12, at 1206; 
YEOMANS, supra note 3, 146. 
 161. See, e.g., Oliphant, supra note 111; Birch, supra note 94. 
 162. See, e.g., Kunich, supra note 12. 
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A. Outer Space Treaty 
 
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)163 necessarily is the starting point 
for any legal analysis of outer space issues in general, and thus for nuclear 
planetary defense in particular.164 As of September 5, 2018, the OST has 
107 states party, including—importantly—all of the nuclear powers.165 Of 
particular relevance to the question of nuclear NEO response is OST 
Article IV, which inter alia provides that states party “. . . undertake not to 
place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on 
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner . . . [and that] . . . the testing of any type of weapons . . . on celestial 
bodies shall be forbidden . . .”166 
Some commentators have suggested that OST Article IV167 may 
prohibit nuclear NEO response outright.168 This conclusion would be 
incorrect, however, even on a strict textual reading. While Article IV 
provides that nuclear weapons (indeed, any weapons of mass destruction) 
cannot be placed in Earth’s orbit, stationed on celestial bodies (such as the 
 
 163. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty, OST) 
1967 (entry into force Oct. 10, 1967), 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
 164. Kunich, supra note 12, at 129; Fasan, supra note 11, at 2345. 
 165. For a full list of OST states party, see United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs, Treaty Database, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space. Note that, at the 
time of writing, the United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280128cbd is out of date in this regard, having not been 
updated to include Nicaragua and Malta (both of which became OST parties in 2017). 
 166. OST, supra note 163, art. IV. This OST obligation is further reinforced by the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(Moon Treaty) 1979 (entry into force Jul. 11, 1984) 1353 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(3) of which 
provides that “States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around 
the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass 
destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.” The Moon Treaty only has 18 
states party as of September 5, 2018, none of which are nuclear powers (see United Nations 
Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXI 
V-2&chapter=24&lang=en), but while it is not currently binding on the relevant states, 
Moon Treaty Article 3(3) nonetheless acts to place a further legal emphasis on the OST 
Article IV obligations that are binding on them. 
 167. As well as Article 3(3) of the Moon Treaty for those states to which it applies. See 
id. 
 168. See Bucknam & Gold, supra note 80, 152; Koplow, supra note 17, at 305; Su, 
Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2; Su, Control Over Activities 
Harmful to the Environment, supra note 12, at 85; Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 35.  
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moon) or otherwise stationed in outer space (for example, in a space 
station), they can be launched into space without contravening the 
provision.169 As such, OST Article IV does not prohibit the launching of a 
rocket- or missile-borne nuclear weapon from Earth into space on a direct 
course to intercept an NEO (i.e., the “on-world” approach).170 It will be 
recalled that some scientific experts have argued that interceptors for NEO 
diversion would stand a much better chance of success if they already were 
stationed in space; it equally will be recalled that others have questioned 
this.171 Difference of opinion in the science aside, it is clear that the “on-
world” approach, which at least some experts support, would remain 
untouched by OST Article IV.  
In contrast, Article IV would seem to rule out an “off-world” 
approach. This conclusion is not straightforward, however, because one 
might question what constitutes a “nuclear weapon” for the purposes of 
OST Article IV: the OST does not define what it means by the term.172 
Some have argued that even the “off-world” approach may not violate 
Article IV, because the peaceful intention underpinning NEO response 
would mean that it would not involve the use of a nuclear “weapon” at 
all.173 In other words, it has been suggested that a “PNE” used against an 
 
 169. The reason that Article IV does not prohibit the launching of weapons of mass 
destruction into space, but only from being in one manner or another stationed there, would 
seem to be a legacy of the Cold War era drafting of the OST. A number of scholars have 
inferred from the wording of Article IV (and its travaux préparatoires) that—while the 
superpowers wished to avoid nuclear weapons being permanently stationed in space 
(hanging over the Earth “Sword of Damocles-like”)—they wanted to retain the possibility of 
undertaking nuclear strikes against each other via intercontinental ballistic missiles launched 
out of the atmosphere on a trajectory that then returned them to their terrestrial target (see, 
e.g., Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON 
L. REV. 649, 655 (1980); Michael G. Gallagher, Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, 111 MIL. L. REV. 11, 41 (1986); Kunich, supra note 12, 130–31). This inference is 
persuasive, although it should be noted that, unsurprisingly, no such underlying intent was 
made explicit by the superpowers during the process of the OST’s drafting (see, for the 
various documents comprising the treaty’s travaux préparatoires, United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: 
Overview, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/travaux-preparato 
ires/outerspacetreaty.html).  
 170. See Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 26; Sweet, supra note 
12, at 226; Kunich, supra note 12, at 130.  
 171. See discussion supra Subsection III.B. 
 172. See Su, Control Over Activities Harmful to the Environment, supra note 12, at 85. 
 173. See, e.g., Kunich, supra note 12, at 138–43; Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary 
Defence, supra note 12, at 2 (making, but then not necessarily subscribing to, this 
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NEO would not be a “nuclear weapon” for the purposes of the OST. 
Perhaps most notably, writing in 1997, Kunich took the view that a 
“weapon” is to be defined by how it is used, not by its inherent properties: 
“David killed Goliath with a rock . . . but a rock only becomes a weapon 
when it is so used . . .”174 
This perhaps is a reasonable conclusion for a rock. However, let us 
consider a gun instead. A firearm conceivably could be used, say, as a 
doorstop or as a paperweight. Nonetheless, unlike a rock, it would be 
difficult intuitively to consider a gun put to such a use as having 
alchemically changed into something other than a “weapon.” Perhaps this 
is because a gun 1) is something designed to be used as a weapon; 2) could 
be (re)employed with great ease as a weapon at any time; and 3) carries an 
inherent risk of accidental discharge that rocks do not. Keeping in mind the 
requirement in Article 31(1) of 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT)175 that treaty provisions be interpreted based on their 
“ordinary meaning,” the present author would argue that a gun still would 
be considered a “weapon,” irrespective of how it was currently being used. 
Scaling this argument up to nuclear explosive devices, while recalling that 
there is no technological difference between a PNE and a nuclear 
weapon,176 any such device would be more analogous to the “gun” than the 
“rock.” As far as the “ordinary meaning” of the text goes, a spade is a 
spade, and a nuclear weapon used in space against an asteroid still would 
be a nuclear weapon.177  
Yet even if this is accepted, it does not establish that a nuclear weapon 
used solely against an NEO would be a “nuclear weapon” for the purposes 
of the OST. The holistic nature of the rules of treaty interpretation178 means 
 
argument); Sweet, supra note 12, at 227 (making, but not necessarily subscribing to, this 
argument). 
 174. Kunich, supra note 12, at 140 (emphasis in original). 
 175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) May 23, 1969 (entry into force 
Jan. 27, 1980) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 176. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.  
 177. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 247. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 226 ¶ 35 (July 8, 1996) (the ICJ seemingly defining 
nuclear weapons based on their characteristics and without reference to how they are used). 
 178. See Commentaries on Draft Article on the Law of Treaties, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session, May 4–July 19, 1966, 
U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, 219–20 http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/ 
a_cn4_191.pdf; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 2005, WTO, WT/DS269/AB/R–WT/DS286/AB/R 176 
(Sept. 12 2007); WEI ZHUANG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
INTERPRETING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND TECHNOLOGIES 162–
  
34 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
that strict textual analysis of the provision’s “ordinary meaning” in the 
abstract amounts to the adoption of an erroneous approach. VCLT Article 
31(1) adopts a teleological understanding of treaty interpretation, requiring 
one to assess the ordinary meaning of the “terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”179 
Identifying a treaty’s object and purpose is a tricky business,180 but 
one can identify elements of the OST that offer some indications in this 
regard. For example, the preamble181 and many of the operative provisions 
of the OST repeatedly reference the goal of ensuring that the exploration 
and use of outer space is for exclusively peaceful purposes.182 The treaty 
also regularly reiterates the need for space exploration and use to be for the 
benefit (variously) of all “peoples,”183 “countries,”184 or “states.”185 The 
core object and purpose of the OST thus can be seen as focused on the 
peaceful use of outer space for the common benefit of mankind.  
It may also be worth noting the requirement in OST Article V to 
render to astronauts “all possible assistance in the event of accident, 
distress, or emergency landing . . . .”186 This obligation in itself clearly 
applies only to astronauts, but it has been suggested that it may be 
indicative of a wider purpose of the OST to mobilize communal resources 
in instances of “danger” in the outer space context.187 Similarly, OST 
 
64 (2017); DANIEL JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 22–
25 (2012). 
 179. VCLT, supra note 175, art. 31(1). 
 180. See Jan Klabbers, Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties, 8 
FINN. YRBK INT’L L. 138 (1997). See also VCLT, supra note 175, art. 31(2) (a treaty’s 
“context” for the purposes of interpretation comprises its text, preamble, and annexes, as 
well as any agreements and instruments made in connection with its conclusion). 
 181. See id. See also Max Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1281, 1300 (2016) (noting the importance of a treaty’s preamble for identifying its 
object and purpose). 
 182. OST, supra note 163, preamble (two references), art. IV (three references), art. IX 
(two references), and art. XI. See generally Kubo Mačák, Silent War: Applicability of the 
Jus in Bello to Military Space Operations, 94 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 15 (2018) (noting the view 
that the OST, and, thus, space law more broadly, is “predicated” on the core idea of the 
exclusive peaceful use of outer space). 
 183. OST, supra note 163, preamble. 
 184. Id. art. I. 
 185. Id. art. IX. 
 186. Id. art. V. 
 187. Seamone, Wishing on a Star, supra note 8, at 1134 (making this point regarding 
NEO threats, but not specifically in relation to interceptive responses). 
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Article IX inter alia requires states to be “guided by the principle of co-
operation and mutual assistance,” and to avoid “adverse changes in the 
environment of the Earth.”188 These obligations are framed in the context of 
the possible consequences of space exploration, rather than in relation to 
natural threats coming from space itself, but could be interpreted as 
indicating contextual notions of cooperation and mutual assistance in the 
interests of all states, and, perhaps most notably for the NEO response 
question, the protection of Earth.189 
Taking these various elements together to create a picture of the object 
and purpose of the OST, it could be argued that the term “nuclear 
weapons” in Article IV should be read—in a teleological sense, albeit in a 
way that perhaps appears to contradict its “ordinary meaning” in the 
abstract—as not including the use of nuclear explosive devices exclusively 
employed for planetary defense.190 Such an action would in theory be 
peaceful, an instance of mutual assistance for the benefit of all mankind 
and aimed at the protection of Earth’s environment. It could thus be viewed 
as being in conformity with (and perhaps even in avoidance of the 
frustration of) the object and purpose of the OST.191 It is this teleological 
argument, not Kunich’s purely textual one,192 which may cast doubt on the 
apparent illegality of the “off-world” NEO nuclear option under the OST.  
However, this possible contextual reading is far from conclusive. For 
example, the OST preamble additionally refers to the need to “refrain from 
placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons”193 
(mirroring Article IV), as well as condemning action that may increase the 
likelihood of “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression”194 in outer space. This further highlights that the peaceful use 
 
 188. OST, supra note 163, art. IX. 
 189. See Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 13–14 (making the 
related point that these obligations may amount to a “general responsibility to distribute 
information to states that could use such information to avert or limit the impact of natural 
disasters [originating in space].”)  
 190. See Tronchetti, supra note 12, at 1030 (arguing on this basis that “international 
action for planetary defense is, at least indirectly, supported” by the OST, albeit not 
specifically referring to nuclear approaches); Pop, supra note 12, at 673. 
 191. See Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 27–28; Koplow, supra 
note 17, 288; Fasan, supra note 11, at 2346. 
 192. Kunich admittedly does briefly buttress his textual argument by stating that this 
interpretation would be supported by the wider object and purpose of the OST, see Kunich, 
supra note 12, at 142. 
 193. OST, supra note 163, preamble. 
 194. Id. 
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of outer space is paramount for the OST, but also particularly emphasizes 
the non-nuclear weaponization of space and the non-militarization of space 
more generally.  
Likewise, while the OST Article IX obligation to avoid “adverse 
changes in the environment of the Earth”195 might point towards a 
contextual interpretation of Article IV that would allow for nuclear 
planetary defense, it might just as easily be read to suggest an underpinning 
legal context within which the risk to Earth’s environment resulting from 
any use of a nuclear weapons reinforces the abstract “ordinary meaning” of 
the Article IV text. It would be reasonable to conclude that the object and 
purpose of the OST prioritizes avoiding the placement nuclear weapons in 
space above all else.196  
One might resort to supplementary means of treaty interpretation as 
per VCLT Article 32, given that it is fairly clear from the foregoing that 
reference to the primary methods in VCLT Article 31 “[l]eaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure”197 when it comes to nuclear NEO 
response. Indeed, it even may be argued—if one were to conclude that OST 
Article IV would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons even in cases where 
this could be humanity’s only hope of survival—that the application of the 
VCLT Article 31 rules might lead to “a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”198  
A review of the travaux préparatoires of the OST indicates, somewhat 
unsurprisingly, that Article IV was drafted with a view to Cold War fears 
of a nuclear arms race in space.199 The drafters were focused on peaceful 
 
 195. Id. art. IX. 
 196. See Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2 (an 
interpretation of the OST that allowed for nuclear NEO response would “encounter 
substantial disagreements, as it would weaken norms of existing international space law 
significantly and run the risk of a nuclear race in outer space.”). 
 197. VCLT, supra note 175, art. 32. 
 198. Id. See Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 27 (making this 
argument about unreasonableness/absurdity).  
 199. See, e.g., Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Committee, 5th 
Sess., sum. rec. 62nd mtg. (July 19, 1966) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.62 (Oct. 24, 
1966) (Poland, stating, when discussing the draft of what became Article IV, that “the arms 
race and the conflicts which took place on earth were bound to affect space, and every effort 
should therefore be made to limit the arms race wherever possible.”); Comm. on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Committee, 5th Sess., sum. rec. 70th mtg. at 6 
(Aug. 3, 1966), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.70 (Oct. 21, 1966) (Soviet Union, arguing that 
the draft article would proscribe the placing in outer space of “a rocket armed with a nuclear 
warhead, because such equipment would obviously not be being used for scientific 
research”, emphasis added); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-
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uses of space and the avoidance of aggressive nuclear deployment, not on 
responses to natural threats emerging from the heavens.200 As such, it is 
possible to argue that the provision never was intended to be an “asteroid 
suicide pact,” and that it should be interpreted on that basis. This is a 
reasonable conclusion, but, of course, the travaux préparatoires again 
could be read as telling a different story, because the stationing of “PNE” 
devices in space precisely can be seen as amounting to the militarization of 
space in effect. As with all other VCLT interpretative methods, 
supplementary reference to the treaty’s drafting leaves unresolved the 
status of an “off-world” nuclear NEO response under the OST. 
A final issue regarding the OST relates to the testing of nuclear 
explosive responses. It will be recalled that many NEO experts have 
asserted the importance of testing planetary defense measures.201 It also 
will be recalled that OST Article IV prohibits the testing of “any type of 
weapons . . . on celestial bodies”, irrespective of wherefrom the device was 
launched. It has been suggested that Article IV would therefore preclude 
the testing of both “off-world” and “on-world” nuclear NEO interceptors, 
“even on the smallest, most remote asteroid.”202  
This claim as to the implications of Article IV for “on-world” nuclear 
NEO response testing can be questioned. Its accuracy depends on whether 
an NEO would be considered a “celestial body,” and there is no agreed 
definition of a “celestial body” in the space law context.203 However, the 
majority view has been to focus on whether the object is “immovable” in 
the sense of land/territory on Earth: if so, then it is a celestial body, and if 
not, then it is not.204 Further, the Moon Treaty makes it clear that it applies 
to “celestial bodies,” but that it does “not apply to extraterrestrial materials 
 
Committee, 5th Sess., sum. rec. 57th mtg. (July 12, 1966) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57 (Oct. 20, 1966) (United States, suggesting, with specific reference to 
the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, that the “central objective was to ensure that 
outer space and celestial bodies were reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.”); 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Committee, 5th Sess., sum. rec. 
66th mtg. (July 25, 1966) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.66 (Oct. 21, 1966) (Hungary, 
contextualizing the draft provision as being about the use of space “for military purposes.”); 
id. at 7 (Soviet Union, noting that the provision related to a “total ban on the use of outer 
space for military purposes.”). 
 200. Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 34; Sweet, supra note 12, at 225–26. 
 201. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 202. Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 34. 
 203. Pop, supra note 12, at 660. 
 204. Id. at 660–64. 
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which reach the surface of the earth by natural means.”205 This implies that 
bodies that could naturally reach Earth’s surface are not to be considered 
“celestial bodies,” at least for the purposes of the Moon Treaty. As such, 
NEOs—which can reach Earth naturally, and which are not “immovable” 
(after all, an attempt to divert them would be the raison d’être of any test 
mission)—likely would not qualify as “celestial bodies.” They could 
therefore be the subject of an “on-world” nuclear diversion test without this 
violating the OST, even if the nuclear device used was considered to be a 
“weapon.” 
Overall, both the actual use and the testing of nuclear weapons against 
an NEO would be lawful under the OST if launched from Earth (i.e., “on-
world”). In contrast, in the view of the present author, the use (or testing) of 
such a device that was already stationed in outer space (“off-world”) would 
be in violation of the OST, but it must be said this conclusion is premised 
on uncertain interpretative gymnastics rather than legal clarity. All that one 
can say for sure is that the “off-world” approach would be legally 
questionable, if perhaps not unquestionably illegal, under the OST.206  
 
B. Limited Test-Ban Treaty 
 
Leaving aside the OST, nuclear NEO response may be unlawful207 
under another Cold War era convention: the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty 
(LTBT).208 As of September 5, 2018, the LTBT has 125 states party, 
including the majority of the nuclear powers (although, crucially, not 
France, China, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)).209 
LTBT Article I(1)(a) inter alia states: 
“Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, 
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other 
 
 205. Moon Treaty, supra note 166, art. 1. See Brian Abrams, First Contact: Establishing 
Jurisdiction Over Activities in Outer Space, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 797, 804–05 (2014). 
 206. See Sweet, supra note 12, 228 (“[i]t is true that one interpretation of the Outer 
Space Treaty … permits non-aggressive military uses of space …”; emphasis added). 
 207. Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2; Su, Control 
Over Activities Harmful to the Environment, supra note 12, at 85; Brooks, supra note 12, at 
246; Pop, supra note 12, at 676. 
 208. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water (Limited Test-Ban Treaty, LTBT, also more commonly known in some parts 
of the world as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, PTBT), 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entry into force 
Oct. 10, 1963). 
 209. For the status of and parties to the LTBT, see United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs, Treaty Database, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban. 
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nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control . . . in the 
atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, 
including territorial waters or high seas . . .”210 
The fundamental goal of the LTBT, as its name suggests, is to prohibit 
the testing of nuclear weapons (in three particular environments, including, 
explicitly, outer space).211 While the status of testing a nuclear weapon 
against an NEO arguably may be lawful under the OST (so long as the test 
interceptor was launched “on-world”),212 the LTBT prohibits “any nuclear 
weapon test explosion . . . in outer space.”213 Again, some might take the 
view that such a prohibition on testing would be notably problematic for 
developing an effective NEO response.214 In the view of the present author, 
however, while the testing of planetary defense measures in general is 
desirable, when it comes to the nuclear option, the abstract testing of 
nuclear weapons in space simply in the name of preparedness would entail 
too high a cost. The LTBT thus desirably resolves any uncertainty under 
the OST as to the legal possibility of conducting nuclear tests in space (at 
least for LTBT states party).215 
The LTBT goes further than merely prohibiting nuclear testing, 
however, in that it also outlaws “any other nuclear explosion . . . in outer 
space.”216 This means that, despite the treaty’s focus on nuclear testing, the 
text of the LTBT Article I(1)(a) would seem to prohibit all nuclear 
explosions in space (test or otherwise).217 This language additionally means 
that the reader should be spared another discussion of the meaning of 
“nuclear weapons” in the LTBT context. In contrast to the OST, the LTBT 
 
 210. LTBT, supra note 208, art. I(1)(a). 
 211. See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States 
of America: Memorandum of Position Concerning The Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests 
[ENDC/78], Letter dated 10 April 1963 from the Co-Chairman of the Conference of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the Secretary-General, transmitting the 
third interim progress report of the Conference, UN Disarmament Comm., U.N. Doc. 
DC/207 (Apr. 12, 1963), annex 1.C (preparatory discussions for the LTBT, focused on 
developing “an agreement on a nuclear weapon test ban”, emphasis added). 
 212. See supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text. 
 213. LTBT, supra note 208, art. I(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 214. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 36 (such a test would “clearly violate the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty”). 
 216. LTBT, supra note 208, art. I(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 217. Kunich, supra note 12, at 145. 
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prohibition is not limited to nuclear “weapons”: It covers “any . . . nuclear 
explosion,” irrespective of purpose.218  
Further, the requirement not to carry out any nuclear explosion “at any 
place”219 would appear to rule out—again, unlike the OST—nuclear 
explosions that occur in space even if they were launched “on-world.”220 
The very occurrence of a nuclear explosion in outer space would violate the 
ordinary meaning of Article I(1)(a), wherever the device originated from: 
both the “on-world” and “off-world” usage of any nuclear explosive device 
against an NEO would appear to be ruled out for LTBT states party. On 
that basis, Brooks categorically concluded in 1997 that the LTBT “flatly 
bans any [nuclear] explosion in outer space [including as an NEO response 
action].”221  
Others have questioned this conclusion, however.222 Kunich (being the 
staunchest advocate of the lawfulness of nuclear NEO response in the 
scholarship) has noted223 that the preamble to the LTBT—as indicative of 
its underpinning object and purpose, which its provisions must be read in 
light of—refers to the treaty’s intent to move towards the elimination of 
“testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,”224 and to 
“achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for 
all time . . . .”225 This would imply that the object and purpose of the LTBT 
predominantly is concerned with military applications of nuclear explosive 
devices—which of course it is226—a fact that might drag us kicking and 
screaming back into tortuous considerations of the meaning of a “weapon.”  
 
 218. Id.; Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 26; Su, Measures 
Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2. 
 219. LTBT, supra note 208, art. I(1)(a). 
 220. Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary Defence, supra note 12, at 2. 
 221. Brooks, supra note 12, at 246. 
 222. See Tronchetti, supra note 12, at 1037; Kunich, supra note 12, at 145–46. 
 223. Id.  
 224. LTBT, supra note 208, preamble (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. (emphasis added).  
 226. See, e.g., UNGA Res. 1762 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1762(XVII) (Nov. 5, 1962) 
(“the continuation of nuclear weapon tests is an important factor in the acceleration of the 
nuclear arms race and that the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting such tests would 
contribute to paving the way towards … [nuclear] disarmament.”); Report of the First 
Committee of the General Assembly, The Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and 
Thermo-Nuclear Tests, UN GAOR, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/5279 (Nov. 5, 1962).  
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However, we can be spared this, in part because the preamble also 
states that “the principal aim”227 of the LTBT was to represent “the 
speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete 
disarmament,”228 and that a further aim is “to put an end to the 
contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances.”229 The 
military application of nuclear devices may be the reason behind these 
goals, but they manifest in a wider object and purpose that prioritizes 
disarmament and the non-discharge of nuclear radiation at all costs (at least 
in the atmosphere, high seas and outer space), without drawing any 
distinction between nuclear weapons and PNEs.  
This reading is strengthened when one considers the LTBT’s travaux 
préparatoires. It is clear that the term “or any other nuclear explosion” in 
Article I(1)(a) was inserted deliberately to avoid the circumvention of the 
aim of that provision through an assertion of “peaceful use.”230 Thus, 
despite Kunich’s contention to the contrary, the references in the LTBT’s 
preamble to “nuclear weapons” are not enough to support a credulity-
defying interpretation of the “ordinary meaning” of the term “or any other 
nuclear explosion” in Article I(1)(a), as read in context and in light of the 
LTBT’s overall object and purpose, so as to allow for nuclear NEO 
responses.231 
Another permissive interpretation of the LTBT advanced in this 
context relates to the fact that LTBT Article I(1) prohibits nuclear 
explosions at any place “under [the state’s] jurisdiction or control.”232 
Gerrard and Barber have suggested that a collision-course NEO would not 
be under the “jurisdiction or control” of any state, and thus that “the 
 
 227. LTBT, supra note 208, preamble (emphasis added). 
 228. Id. (emphasis added). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., ARTHUR DEAN, TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION 
100-01 (1966) (commentary on the drafting of the LTBT text by one of the 
negotiators/drafters). 
 231. Brooks, supra note 12, at 246 (stating in reference to LTBT art. I(1)(a) that 
“certainly the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a ‘nuclear explosion’ is quite clear.”). 
 232. LTBT, supra note 208, art. I(1). The Cold War era intent behind the prohibition’s 
limitation to areas under a state’s “jurisdiction and control” was to allow for the possibility 
of the superpowers using of nuclear weapons against an enemy in one of the LTBT 
protected environments during wartime. See Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 88th cong., 1st Sess., on exec. mtg., 
74-78 (1963). 
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detonation of nuclear weapons would not be prohibited by the letter of 
[LTBT Article I(1)(a)].”233  
Wider space law makes it clear that jurisdiction and control in outer 
space is legally retained for human-originated objects, space stations, 
instrumentalities, and personnel.234 Simply put, a state has 
jurisdiction/control over what it launches into space.235 NEOs, though, are 
naturally occurring objects, and given that outer space and its natural 
contents are not subject to national appropriation,236 Gerrard and Barber’s 
assertion that no state would have jurisdiction or control over an NEO 
would seem correct.  
However, while an NEO itself would not be under a state’s 
jurisdiction/control, any space object carrying a nuclear weapon likely 
would be. On that basis, the response mission may still fall foul of LTBT 
Article I(1)(a): any delivery system for a the nuclear explosion in outer 
space would be under a state’s jurisdiction/control even though its target 
was not.237 
Overall, the most convincing interpretation of the LTBT is that it 
would indeed prohibit a nuclear NEO response of any kind (whether “on-
world” or “off-world”), as well as the testing of any such action. The LTBT 
 
 233. Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 35. 
 234. GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN THE AIRSPACE AND OUTER 
SPACE: LEGAL CRITERIA FOR SPATIAL DELIMITATION 172–90 (2012). 
 235. See, e.g., OST, supra note 163, art. VIII (a “State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control 
over such object, and over any personnel thereof …”). 
 236. See, e.g., id. art. I (“[o]uter space … is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty …”). 
 237. It is worth here noting LTBT, supra note 208, art. I(1)(b), which—additional to 
Article I(1)(a)—further provides that any nuclear explosion is prohibited “in any other 
environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial 
limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted …” Any 
nuclear detonation in space would result in the presence of radioactive debris (see Richard 
Latter & Robert E. Lelevier, Detection of Ionization Effects from Nuclear Explosions in 
Space, 68 J. GEOPHYSICS REV. 1643, 1643 (1963) (“For space [nuclear] explosions, 
ionization of the atmosphere results from the direct radiations emitted by the explosions. 
These radiations include … the material debris from the nuclear device itself.”)), with this 
debris necessarily being outside of the territorial limits of all states (i.e., in outer space). At 
first glance, one might therefore conclude that the prohibition in Article I(1)(b) would mean 
that nuclear NEO response in outer space would still violate the LTBT, irrespective of 
questions of “jurisdiction and control”. However, this would be incorrect: LTBT, supra note 
208, Article I(1)(b) concerns “other environments” (emphasis added), meaning that it 
governs nuclear explosions that occur in environments other than those detailed in art. 
I(1)(a) (a list that, of course, includes outer space). 
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would appear less ambiguously and more comprehensively to prohibit 
nuclear NEO responses than does the OST. Nonetheless, as with the OST, 
this remains a conclusion to some extent born of eye-of-the-beholder treaty 
interpretation rather than anything approaching legal certainty on the issue, 
especially when it comes to the question of “jurisdiction or control.” Plus, 
it is crucial to keep in mind that three of the nuclear powers are not parties 
to the LTBT anyway, including, perhaps most pertinently in the space-
faring context, China. 
 
C. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
 
It is next necessary to consider the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT)238 in the nuclear NEO response context. CTBT Article 
I(1) prohibits “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear 
explosion.”239 Therefore, unlike the LTBT, it is not limited to specific 
environments, nor is it applicable only to areas under the state in question’s 
jurisdiction/control. Wider teleological interpretative approaches would be 
unlikely to alter the clear ordinary meaning of the CTBT Article I(1) text in 
a way that would allow for a nuclear NEO response. This is not least 
because the CTBT’s preamble reflects the wording of Article I(1), making 
it explicit that the key goal of the treaty is the “cessation of all nuclear 
weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions.”240 It thus rightly 
has been concluded that CTBT Article I(1) would rule out all nuclear NEO 
responses: the implication of its prohibition for nuclear planetary defense is 
unequivocal.241 
However, while it has been widely signed and ratified, the CTBT still 
has not yet entered into force.242 It therefore does not bind states, meaning 
that Article I is not directly applicable to the nuclear NEO response 
question. This is not necessarily the end of the story when it comes to the 
CTBT though. It has been argued that the states that have signed the treaty 
 
 238. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027 
(Aug. 26 1996). 
 239. Id. art. I(1). 
 240. Id. preamble (emphasis added). 
 241. Pop, supra note 12, at 676; Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 
26. 
 242. As of September 5, 2018, 183 states have signed the CTBT and 166 states have 
ratified it (see Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, Status of Signature and Ratification, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-
signature-and-ratification). However, the CTBT will only enter into force following 
ratification by all of the states listed in Annex 2, as per CTBT, supra note 238, art. XIV.  
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still may be bound by its core obligations, despite the fact that it is not yet 
in force.243 Pursuant to VCLT Article 18, states that have consented to be 
bound by treaties have an obligation not to do anything that would “defeat 
the object and purpose” of the treaty in question.244 Given that most of the 
normative eggs of the CTBT are found in the basket of Article I, this might 
mean that signatory states (which include all of the nuclear powers aside 
from India, Pakistan, and the DPRK) are bound by that article’s terms. This 
possible implication of VCLT Article 18 for the binding nature of Article I 
of the CTBT remains disputed,245 however, and even if signatory states 
indeed were indirectly bound in this way, three of the nuclear powers still 
would remain outside of its reach as non-signatories.  
A strong case also can be made that the comprehensive nuclear test-
ban set out in the CTBT has become customary international law.246 If so, 
this would mean that all states—persistent objectors aside247—would be 
bound by it.248 However, to the extent that the CTBT ban is mirrored in 
custom, this probably is limited to the requirement not to test: it would be 
difficult to see it as extending also to the “any other nuclear explosion” 
aspect of Article I(1).249 
 
 243. See Masahiko Asada, CTBT: Legal Questions Arising from its Non-Entry-into-
Force, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 85, 94–103, 121–22 (2002); David S. Jonas, The 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status in the United States and the 
Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1007, 1029–40 
(2007); Lisa Tabassi, The Nuclear Test Ban: Lex Lata or de Lege Ferenda?, 14 J. CONFLICT 
& SEC. L. 309, 313–21 (2009). 
 244. VCLT, supra note 175, art. 18 (“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when … it has expressed its consent to be bound by 
the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is 
not unduly delayed.”).  
 245. See, e.g., David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a 
Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 567-68 (2010). 
 246. See, e.g., James A. Green, India and a Customary Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban: Persistent Objection, Peremptory Norms and the 123 Agreement, 51 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 
3, 9–18 (2011); Grant Guthrie, Nuclear Testing Rocks the Sub-Continent: Can International 
Law Halt the Impending Nuclear Conflict Between India and Pakistan, 23 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 495, 508–18 (1999–2000); Tabassi, supra note 243, at 309-52; Peter 
Hulsroj, Jus Cogens & Disarmament, 46 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 8–10 (2006). 
 247. On persistent objection, see generally JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR 
RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016). 
 248. Green, supra note 246, at 18-33. 
 249. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 246, at 518 (referring to the “custom against nuclear 
testing” stemming from the CTBT, emphasis added). 
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The legal consequences of the CTBT for nuclear NEO response thus 
are unclear and, if it has any, they would be indirect. It may be argued that 
the signatory states are bound by CTBT Article I through VCLT Article 18, 
and that the CTBT’s influence on customary international law may also act 
legally to restrict nuclear planetary defense. Neither of these possible legal 
implications can be asserted with any certainty. Were the CTBT to come 
into force, though, any uncertainty would be removed: it would rule nuclear 
NEO response out entirely for its states party. 
 
D. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
 
As already has been noted,250 the TPNW is not yet in force and the 
nuclear powers all conspicuously have not engaged with it. Its impact thus 
currently is far more significant in a political sense than a legal one. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to explore what the legal implications of the 
TPNW would be for nuclear planetary defense were it to come into force 
(and, particularly, were it to come into force for the nuclear powers), either 
directly or rather more plausibly through the development of customary 
international law that reflected it. TPNW Article 1 inter alia requires states 
party  
never under any circumstances to . . . [d]evelop, test, produce, 
manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices [or] . . . [u]se or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices . . . .251  
This categorical prohibition on, amongst other things, any possession 
or usage of any nuclear explosive device whatsoever goes even further than 
the (already stringent) restrictions of the CTBT. The preamble of the 
TPNW highlights the treaty’s focus on  
the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result 
from any use of nuclear weapons, . . . the consequent need to 
completely eliminate such weapons, [and] . . . the risks posed by 
the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any 
nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or 
design.252  
There is no question that any interpretation of Article 1, whether in 
isolation or taken in the context of the wider object and purpose of the 
 
 250. See supra notes 133- 136 and accompanying text. 
 251. TPNW, supra note 133, art. 1. 
 252. Id. preamble (emphasis added). 
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TPNW, would outlaw a nuclear NEO response entirely. The TPNW’s 
raison d’être is to realize total nuclear disarmament and the complete 
absence of any nuclear explosion (anywhere, at any time, for any reason). 
The non-binding TPNW may be only “soft law” at present, but it 
nonetheless sets out a “hard” “soft law” prohibition, in that its meaning is 
unequivocal and it is framed as a mandatory obligation rather than as an 
aspirational or progressive one.253 This “legal” clarity adds, at a minimum, 
political context to the much less clear legal restrictions on nuclear NEO 
response that stem from the existing Cold War era treaties. 
 
E. Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in  
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer  
Space Objects 
 
The 2014 PPWT, which remains an unadopted and controversial draft 
text, is of even less legal relevance at present than the TPNW.254 
Nonetheless, it is worth briefly exploring what its legal implications would 
be for nuclear NEO response (again, subject to disclaimers about this being 
only potential in a legal sense). 
PPWT Article II states, commendably simply, that parties undertake 
“[n]ot to place any weapons in outer space.”255 This prohibition is not 
merely limited to weapons stationed in space, as is the case under the OST. 
“On-world” weapons launched into space would run afoul of it too. 
Moreover, unlike the OST, the draft PPWT aims for clarity in setting out 
this obligation by explicitly defining what a “weapon” actually is in the 
context of outer space:  
[a weapon is] any outer space object or component thereof which 
has been produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the 
normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth’s 
surface or in its atmosphere, or to eliminate human beings or 
components of the biosphere which are important to human 
existence, or to inflict damage on them by using any principles of 
physics.256  
 
 253. See, generally Arnold N. Pronto, Understanding the Hard/Soft Distinction in 
International Law, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 941 (2015); Christine M. Chinkin, The 
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. 
L. Q. 850 (1989). 
 254. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. 
 255. PPWT 2014, supra note 144, art. II. 
 256. Id. art. I(b). 
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The PPWT further defines an “object” in this context as “any device 
placed in outer space and designed for operating therein.”257 
These definitional clarifications—helpful as they are in a wider sense 
when it comes to understanding the obligations contained in the draft 
treaty—unfortunately do not clarify things in relation to the specific 
question of nuclear NEO response. Under the PPWT definition, NEOs are 
not “objects,” as they are neither “placed in outer space” nor “designed to 
operate” in outer space (indeed, they are not “designed” at all). As such, a 
device “produced or converted” specifically to “to destroy, damage or 
disrupt” an NEO seemingly would not be a “weapon” for the purposes of 
PPWT Article II.  
However, the “dual use” nuclear weapon/PNE issue again causes 
interpretative uncertainty here. One would need to conclude whether a 
nuclear explosive device used against an NEO had been produced for that 
purpose, or in fact had been “produced or converted to destroy, damage or 
disrupt” (man-made) objects, or “to eliminate human beings,” and simply 
then repurposed. If a nuclear weapon was produced from scratch 
specifically to be launched at an incoming NEO, might this mean that it 
was not in fact produced to “to eliminate human beings,” and thus that it 
fell outside of the PPWT’s reach? Or, would the fact that the advent of 
nuclear weapons per se was with a view to the elimination of, or at least to 
act as a threat of the elimination of, human beings mean that any and all 
such weapons inherently would be prohibited? 
A teleological appraisal of the PPWT does not help clarify matters. 
For example, the draft text explicitly recalls the OST’s prohibition on the 
placement of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction in orbit in its preamble,258 suggesting a core 
nuclear disarmament underpinning, but it also makes it clear that nothing in 
the treaty should be interpreted as preventing the peaceful use of space,259 
which might point one towards an allowance for PNEs in an extreme case 
of planetary defense.  
Thus, while the CTBT and TPNW contain clear (if currently non-
binding, at least directly) provisions that would prohibit a nuclear NEO 
response, the PPWT is another example of a treaty drafted without NEOs in 
mind that would cause significant uncertainty if it ever became necessary to 
attempt to apply it in that context. 
 
 
 257. Id. art. I(a). 
 258. Id. preamble. 
 259. Id. art. III. 
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F. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
 
Finally in this section it is necessary to take brief note of a treaty that 
no longer is in force. A consequence of the fact that much of the legal 
literature on planetary defense was written in the 1990s is that writings on 
the subject devoted a notable amount of ink to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABMT)260 between the U.S. and Soviet Union. It was 
widely accepted that the ABMT would represent a serious legal 
impediment to either state (or subsequently the Soviet Union’s successor 
states) using nuclear weapons in planetary defense.261  
However, the U.S. withdrew from the ABMT in 2002, resulting in its 
termination.262 This means that the ABMT is no longer of any relevance to 
this or any legal question, other than as “a historical footnote.”263 It is noted 
herein only to serve to update the existing literature, given the prominence 
of the ATBT in much of the previous scholarship on the subject. 
 
VII.  POSSIBILITIES FOR PRECLUDING THE APPARENT 
UNLAWFULNESS OF NUCLEAR NEO RESPONSE 
 
Uncertainties in interpretation mean that it is difficult to conclude 
categorically that current treaty law (for those treaties in force, at least) 
outlaws nuclear NEO response outright, although on balance, most nuclear 
NEO missions would fall afoul of (some, or all of) the treaty provisions 
discussed in the previous section. It certainly may be said that there exists 
significant doubt as to the lawfulness of any such action, especially for the 
states party to the LTBT. This section therefore explores ways in which the 
prima facie illegality of nuclear NEO response potentially could be 
precluded under existing legal mechanisms, should an impact-bound NEO 
appear.  
 
 
 260. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
ABMT) 1972 (entry into force Oct. 3, 1972) 944 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 261. This particularly was on the basis that id. art. V(1) required parties inter alia not to 
deploy “space-based” ABMs. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note 12, at 227–28; Gerrard & Barber, 
supra note 12, 36–37; Kunich, supra note 12, at 150–57.  
 262. For discussion, see David Gray, “The Law”, Termination of the ABM Treaty and 
the Political Question Doctrine: Judicial Succor for Presidential Power, 34 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 156 (2004). 
 263. Pop, supra note 12, at 676. 
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A. Treaty Withdrawal 
 
One proposed264 option to circumvent the seeming illegality of the 
nuclear option has been for relevant states simply to withdraw from the 
treaties that otherwise may prohibit them from effectively acting to protect 
the planet.  
Parties can withdraw from the OST without needing to invoke any 
particular justifying circumstances, with the withdrawal taking effect after 
a 12-month notice period.265 The LTBT also allows for a right of 
withdrawal, after only a 3-month notice period, but requires that the 
withdrawal be in relation to “extraordinary events” that jeopardize the 
state’s “supreme interests.”266 The CTBT, TPNW and PPWT all contain 
largely identical withdrawal provisions to the LTBT, in that they require 
that any withdrawal from them is necessary to protect essential state 
interests from extraordinary events, although the notice period in each case 
is different: 6 months,267 12 months,268 and 6 months,269 respectively. Of 
course, this currently is academic for the TPNW and PPWT, as they are not 
yet in force; nor is the CTBT, although if it is seen as indirectly binding its 
signatory states, the provision for them to withdraw from it would exist. 
A verified, large, collision-course NEO reasonably could be 
considered to represent an “extraordinary event” jeopardizing the “supreme 
interests” of the state—indeed, likely multiple and perhaps even all states—
allowing for withdrawal from the LTBT (as well as from the 
CTBT/TPNW/PPWT, were they to come into force). Given that it is the 
state itself that determines the existence of such extraordinary 
circumstances, there would be little question that withdrawals from these 
treaties in the NEO impact scenario would be lawful (and, for the OST, no 
justification is required for withdrawal at all). 
The “withdrawal approach” nonetheless may be problematic for two 
reasons. First, there is a risk that in some cases, waiting 12 or even only 3 
months for a withdrawal notice to take effect may defeat the very reason 
for the withdrawal in the first place. Doing nothing for a period of months 
 
 264. See Kunich, supra note 12, at 149; Tronchetti, supra note 12, at 1037; Legal 
Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 27; Su, Measures Proposed for Planetary 
Defence, supra note 12, at 3. 
 265. OST, supra note 163, art. XVI. 
 266. LTBT, supra note 208, art. IV 
 267. CTBT, supra note 238, art. IX. 
 268. TPNW, supra note 133, art. 17. 
 269. PPWT 2014, supra note 144, art. XII. 
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after an NEO was first identified could mean that it was then too late to 
respond to it.270 
Second, the notion of powerful, nuclear states unilaterally 
withdrawing from fundamental, cornerstone treaties of space law (the OST) 
and nuclear non-proliferation (the LTBT) because of an emerging NEO 
threat would be extremely concerning. As a matter of law, withdrawal may 
be a viable solution to the illegality of a nuclear planetary defense 
operation, but it would be far from a desirable one in terms of the integrity 
of the entire regimes of international space and nuclear non-proliferation 
law. Much of the success of these regimes has precisely stemmed from the 
widespread ratification of their key treaties, including (for the most part) by 
the nuclear powers. Even if enough time remained to act after the required 
notice period(s), it would seem unsatisfactory for states to do so 
unilaterally271 by extricating themselves from essential legal frameworks 
that have much wider implications for human good.  
 
B. Treaty Suspension by Consent 
 
While the option of state withdrawal is made explicit in both the OST 
and the LTBT, neither treaty makes any provision for their respective 
suspension. Yet VCLT Article 57 allows that a treaty can be temporarily 
suspended for all or some of its parties not just when the treaty explicitly 
provides for this, but also “[a]t any time by consent of all the parties after 
consultation with the other contracting States.”272 Article 20 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility further confirms that consensual treaty 
suspension—as with consent in relation to the non-performance of any 
obligation in international law given by the state(s) to which it is owed—
acts to preclude the wrongfulness of an act that without such consent would 
otherwise constitute a violation of the treaty.273 
Although such a possibility has not been advanced in the existing 
literature on planetary defense, it is conceivable that the states parties to the 
OST and LTBT collectively could agree to suspend these treaties so as to 
allow for a nuclear NEO response mission to be launched. This would 
 
 270. Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 27. 
 271. On the general desirability of multilateral legal approach, see infra notes 374-381 
and accompanying text. 
 272. VCLT, supra note 175, art. 57(b). 
 273. Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, 72-77 (2001), art. 20 and accompanying commentary. 
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remedy the concerns associated with the “treaty withdrawal” option.274 
First, no formal period of notice would be required: consent for suspension 
can be given “in advance or even at the time [that the act] is occurring.”275 
Second, suspension would not result in a single state (or small number of 
states) unilaterally extricating themselves from crucial treaties, but instead 
would amount to a collective decision to allow for action that otherwise 
would violate them. This would help to protect against abusive appeals to 
“asteroid threats” as a pretext for military activity. It also would be 
inherently temporary. Rather than meaning that a state abandoned its 
obligations indefinitely through withdrawal, the relevant treaties would 
only be suspended for as long as was necessary to implement planetary 
defense, and then would apply to all states party just as before.276 
Treaty suspension thus may be a more appealing option than treaty 
withdrawal, but it would replace one set of concerns with another. On 
balance, a multilateral approach would—in the view of this author277—be 
preferable to a unilateral one, but suspension could be seen as being too 
multilateral in nature. Treaty suspension would require the consent of every 
single state party to the LTBT and, at least if an “off-world” approach was 
contemplated, the OST too.278 The states party to these treaties are not 
identical, of course, which would add further levels of complexity in 
reaching agreement. In any event, the high number of parties to both 
conventions (125 and 107, respectively), and the fact that they represent 
particularly fundamental treaties for the nuclear non-proliferation and space 
law regimes, might suggest that universal agreement would be rather 
difficult to achieve in relation to suspending even one of them so as to 
allow for nuclear weapons to be used in outer space.279 
Some writers have expressed the concern that any approach involving 
collective decision-making by a large number of states in relation to NEO 
response may create a “too many cooks in the kitchen” problem, leading to 
potentially catastrophic inaction.280 At the very least, one might reasonably 
 
 274. See discussion supra Section VI.A. 
 275. U.N. Doc. A/56/10, supra note 273, at 74. 
 276. See VCLT, supra note 175, art. 72. 
 277. See infra notes 374-381 and accompanying text. 
 278. See U.N. Doc. A/56/10, supra note 273, at 176; VCLT, supra note 175, art. 57(b). 
 279. It also should be recalled that the consent on the part of each of these states must be 
“valid”, in that, for example, it would need to be given by an appropriate authority and not 
coerced. See U.N. Doc. A/56/10, supra note 273, at 175. 
 280. See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 46; Seamone, The Precautionary Principle, 
supra note 8, at 22. 
  
52 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
fear that the need for universal consent may mean that suspension of the 
relevant treaties would not occur in time. There may be no requirement for 
a formal notice period as would be the case with the “treaty withdrawal” 
approach, but this does not mean that treaty suspension necessarily would 
be a quicker way of seeking to preclude wrongfulness in a context where 
the clock would be ticking.  
Treaty suspension ultimately represents another legally viable option 
for planetary defense, and one that would desirably engage the wider 
international community rather than a single “white knight” state. It still 
would be ad hoc and reactive, however, and the necessity of universal 
agreement likely would mean that it would be a difficult option to 
implement successfully. 
 
C. Self-Defense 
 
An almost universally advanced argument in the limited legal 
literature on NEO response is that the probable illegality of nuclear NEO 
response could be precluded by the exercise of the right of self-defense.281 
On the face of it, one can see why this approach has been so strongly 
advocated. Self-defense explicitly is sanctified in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter as an “inherent” right for states to defend themselves.282 It also can 
be exercised collectively on behalf of other states.283 This would indicate 
that in cases where the physical consequences of an NEO impact were 
going to be regional rather than global, states that were not anywhere near 
the predicted point of impact still could act to protect others.284 The right 
clearly “applies to attacks from outer space” too, at least in the sense that a 
state can respond in self-defense to an attack against one of its space 
objects that was launched from another state’s space object.285  
An inherent right of defense that can be executed collectively, 
including in space, would intuitively seem to be a perfect fit for NEO 
 
 281. See Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, 10–11, at 26; Gerrard & 
Barber, supra note 12, at 39; Kunich, supra note 12, at 132; Sweet, supra note 12, at 226–
27; Tronchetti, supra note 12, at 1029, 1032, 1035; Pop, supra note 12, at 674; Koplow, 
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response mission intended to defend a notable part, if not all, of 
humanity.286 However, despite the overwhelming support for the “self-
defense” approach in the literature, it is not in fact a suitable legal 
mechanism for precluding the unlawfulness of a nuclear NEO response.  
Self-defense, conceptually, is focused on a defensive response to 
human-authored attacks or threats of attack,287 and exists as an exception to 
the ad bellum prohibition on the use of force.288 That prohibition is set out 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,289 which outlaws “the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state . . . .”290 Forcible action against an asteroid or comet would not be 
directed “against . . . any state,” but, instead, against a large space rock. 
This means that the prohibition of the use of force would not be breached 
by a planetary defense action.291 Resorting to self-defense therefore would 
amount to an attempt to employ an exception to a rule that would not be 
violated by the action undertaken, as a way to try to justify the fact that that 
action was in violation of other rules of international law (LTBT, OST, 
etc.). 
It admittedly is true that self-defense—despite intrinsically acting as 
an exception to the prohibition on the use of force—can in some cases292 
preclude the wrongfulness of obligations other than the prohibition itself.293 
 
 286. Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response, supra note 8, at 11. 
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) famously concluded in 1996, for 
example, that in extreme circumstances the use of nuclear weapons may be 
lawful as an action in self-defense, including through insulating the state 
using such weapons in a defensive manner against the wrongfulness of the 
breach of (some) norms of international law beyond Article 2(4).294 So 
perhaps self-defense can preclude the wrongfulness of obligations 
stemming from the LTBT et al. in the planetary defense context after all.  
In its commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
however, the International Law Commission (ILC) made it clear that 
“[s]elf-defence may justify non-performance of certain obligations other 
than that under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, 
provided that such non-performance is related to the breach of that 
provision.”295 Again, it is difficult to see how the non-performance of 
obligations under the LTBT et al. can be viewed as being “related to the 
breach” of a prohibition that would not even be prima facie engaged by a 
planetary defense mission.296 The applicability of self-defense to nuclear 
NEO response thus appears highly questionable.297  
Even if one (dubiously) were to conclude that the “inherent” nature of 
the right of self-defense was sufficient to interpret it more broadly so as to 
dismiss such concerns,298 the application of the substance of the right to 
NEOs still would be extremely problematic. First, stemming from the 
nature of self-defense as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force, 
Article 51 provides for the exercise of the right in response to an “armed 
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attack.”299 Although nothing in the UN Charter identifies exactly what an 
“armed attack” is,300 it would take a notably liberal interpretation of the 
term to see it as encompassing naturally occurring threats from space.301 
Whatever risk they pose, asteroids neither are “armed” nor “attacking.” 
Second, Article 51 states that for self-defense to be triggered, an 
armed attack must have occurred.302 Waiting for an NEO impact to have 
“occurred” before acting to stop it would defeat the purpose of so doing, of 
course: there would be no repelling the army back after an attack when the 
“army” in question was a giant space rock. If it were legally framed as self-
defense, any NEO response action would thus necessarily be an action of 
anticipatory self-defense.303 There exists a long-standing and well-known 
debate as to whether action in self-defense can lawfully be taken in an 
anticipatory manner (i.e., before the “armed attack” has “occurred” 
contrary to what the text of Article 51 would seem to require).304 This is not 
the place to explore that debate, but there is increasing consensus amongst 
scholars305 (and, seemingly, albeit less clearly, amongst states)306 that 
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anticipatory action will be considered lawful if the attack being responded 
to is an imminent one.  
NEO interception may require months (or years) to implement.307 
Some experts admittedly have argued that, unlike most options, a nuclear 
approach could be successfully implemented in a matter of days.308 Even if 
this were correct, however, it would seem desirable that any interception 
mission be launched as soon as the collision-course NEO was properly 
identified and verified. An NEO mission therefore may not sit comfortably 
with the requirement of imminence. It is true that an understanding of 
imminence recently has been advanced in relation to self-defense that 
relates more to the degree of certainty as to the occurrence of the 
impending attack than to its temporal proximity,309 but it is far from certain 
whether an NEO that was months/years away from impact would be seen 
as representing an “imminent” attack sufficient for anticipatory action in 
self-defense to be taken.310 
The “self-defense approach” may also engage significant ad bellum 
controversies as to whether the right can be exercised in cases where the 
author of the armed attack is not a state,311 a debate that is centered on the 
question of the lawfulness of responses to attacks by non-state actors. 
There is notable jurisprudence and scholarship indicating that the author of 
an armed attack must be a state.312 There also is significant support and 
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evidence underpinning a contrary position, allowing for self-defense as a 
response against non-state actors.313 Leaving the worms of that debate 
trapped firmly inside their can, it nonetheless may be said that neither side 
credibly can claim that it is settled. That fact in itself would suggest that, in 
an NEO impact scenario, where there would be no author of the “armed 
attack” at all, the already murky waters of attempting to apply the right of 
self-defense further may be muddied.  
On the basis of all of the foregoing, Su—seemingly alone amongst the 
handful of legal scholars who have written on the NEO response topic—
has correctly held “it could be safely posited that to defend against a natural 
disaster [such as NEO impact] is not self-defense in the legal sense.”314 
 
D.  UN Security Council Authorization  
 
Amongst the writers who have worked on the legal aspects of NEO 
response, a few have concluded that the powers of the UN Security Council 
“in principle certainly are broad enough to encompass . . . a NEO threat-
related decision-making framework.”315 This conclusion credibly can be 
reached, but is not self-evident. Given that the Security Council is vested 
with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,”316 though, it is easy to see why the inherent security implications 
of nuclear planetary defense might lead one to conclude that authorization 
by the Council would be a suitable—some have argued the only 
suitable317—mechanism for establishing lawfulness.  
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Situating decision-making with the Security Council also can be seen 
as a desirably “multilateral” option.318 The Council admittedly is only 
constituted of 15 states, which may to some extent belie the idea that it 
would represent a collective, community-orientated mechanism, especially 
given that its five permanent members also all are nuclear powers. Yet the 
small membership of the Security Council may act to balance the 
desirability of a multilateral approach against fears319 that “too many 
cooks” might mean that no timely decision could be taken. 
The Security Council has the power under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter to implement measures to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.320 It is clear that the exercise of this power does not need to be 
in response to a particular violation of international law by a state,321 
meaning that the fact that any NEO threat would not stem from a previous 
breach of international law would not be problematic. The Council’s ability 
to implement binding measures is simply triggered by the occurrence of “a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”322  
The existence of one or more of these triggering circumstances is self-
determined by the Council,323 allowing for substantial discretionary scope 
as to the circumstances in which its Chapter VII powers can be 
employed.324 This discretion is not unlimited, in that the existence of “a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” must be 
interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of Charter regime and the 
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Council’s function within that structure,325 but its limits have been 
stretched significantly by the Council since the end of the Cold War.326  
An impending NEO impact would be almost impossible to 
conceptualize as an “act of aggression” (or even a “breach of the peace”), 
but its likely transboundary, devastating effects mean that a reasonable 
argument could be made that a collision-course NEO could be considered a 
“threat to the peace.”327 Notably, however, the Council largely has 
refrained from developing its understanding of a “threat to the peace” to 
incorporate natural disasters in genere,328 or specific environmental security 
threats such as climate change.329 This is not to say that the Council could 
not or would not identify NEO impact as a threat to the peace. Were it to do 
so though, this would go beyond what it has commonly considered to 
amount to such a triggering threat in comparable contexts, which may at 
least cast doubt on the potential for it to act. 
Further, even assuming that a determination was made by the Security 
Council that an incoming NEO indeed represented a “threat to the peace,” 
questions would remain as to whether the Council then could authorize a 
nuclear explosion in outer space in response. Article 103 of the UN Charter 
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famously is explicit that obligations under the Charter prevail over “any 
other international agreement,”330 whereas Article 25 of the Charter 
stipulates that member states are required to implement the binding 
decisions of the Security Council.331 It often is said that the combination of 
Articles 103 and 25 means that where Council-mandated actions conflict 
with obligations in other treaties, the illegality of the breach of those 
obligations is excused.332 The Council, therefore, prima facie could 
authorize action that otherwise would violate, say, the LTBT. 
Yet, the Council cannot authorize states to violate any norm of 
international law that it wishes.333 It is widely agreed, for example, that it 
cannot act or authorize states to act in a manner that would be contrary to 
norms that have acquired the status of jus cogens.334 Some commentators 
have suggested that OST Article IV335 may have acquired this character, 
while others at least have implied that the ban in LTBT Article I(1) may be 
peremptory.336 Despite their undeniably crucial importance, however, 
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neither OST Article IV nor LTBT I(1) can be considered to constitute a jus 
cogens norm: there simply has not been sufficient recognition and 
acceptance of these rules as having such status by the international 
community of states.337 
Nonetheless, even when it comes to the large corpus of non-
peremptory jus dispositivum, the Security Council does not have unlimited 
power to deviate from existing legal requirements.338 The Council must, as 
a minimum, act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN, 
as per Article 24(2) of the Charter.339 It cannot authorize violations of 
human rights340 or international humanitarian law (IHL)341 standards, for 
example, not least because both human rights and humanitarianism 
represent key purposes of the organization.342 The UN’s purposes also 
include the maintenance of international peace and security, of course,343 
and even a limited, non-aggressive use of nuclear weapons in space still 
would have significant implications for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. This fact might suggest that the Council would—if it 
were to authorize a nuclear NEO response—be acting in a manner that 
could violate its Article 24(2) obligation. 
In the particular context of nuclear planetary defense though, where 
peace and security potentially are threatened both by the incoming peril and 
the proposed remedy, so long as the NEO threat was verified and genuine, 
a reasonable counterargument could be made. The Council probably would 
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not be precluded from authorizing nuclear planetary defense if it saw this 
as the only appropriate, proportional344 means of avoiding catastrophic 
harm. It surely then would need to authorize nuclear interception explicitly 
and unequivocally, and only as a “one off” act. Any authorization that was 
more open-ended than that would run the risk of the Council acting beyond 
(and perhaps even contrary to) its mandate. 
Overall, a case can be made that the Security Council would possess a 
(restricted) power to authorize a nuclear NEO response, albeit that 
uncertainty would remain until this were ever tested. A further concern, 
however, beyond the legal power of the Council in this regard, would be 
political likelihood of it being able to act. All it would take was one of the 
five permanent members to view assertions as to the need for a nuclear 
response to avert a purported NEO impact as a pretext for nuclear 
aggression in space, and its inevitable veto would mean that the Council 
would be unable to authorize the action in any event. This hardly seems an 
unrealistic scenario,345 especially given that the state or states that were 
seeking to launch a nuclear interception mission almost certainly would 
insist on retaining control over the weapons concerned, rather than, say, 
ceding them to UN operational control.346 
 
E. Necessity 
 
The concept of necessity in international law stretches back 
centuries,347 but its modern existence under customary international law348 
is set out in Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.349 As per Article 25, necessity can preclude the 
wrongfulness of an act in breach of international law if that act is “the only 
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
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imminent peril; and . . . [d]oes not seriously impair an essential interest” of 
other states or the wider international community.350 
Applying these requirements to the nuclear NEO response scenario,351 
the impact of a large NEO on the surface of Earth would have the potential 
to threaten the existence of at least one state. It would be reasonable to 
conclude that acting to avert such an impact would qualify as the 
safeguarding of an “essential interest.”352 Further, when it comes to 
necessity, the “essential interests” of a state are not limited merely to 
threats to its very existence.353 Thus, the avoidance of a smaller-scale, but 
still catastrophic, NEO collision could also qualify.354  
Whether the impending impact would amount to a “grave” peril would 
depend on the circumstances.355 There would need to be a high degree of 
certainty that the impact would occur, of course, and that the consequences 
of that impact would be significantly harmful (which would depend on 
factors including the size, composition, trajectory, and speed of the NEO in 
question).356 The fact that an act justified by necessity must be “the only 
way” for the state to protect against the relevant “peril”357 also would mean 
that there would need to be a relatively high degree of certainty that a 
nuclear explosion would be the only effective method of diverting the NEO 
(or, at least, that it be very clear that this represented the best chance of so 
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doing).358 Further, the need for the peril to be actual and not merely 
envisioned359 likely would mean that preparatory actions taken before a 
collision-course NEO was identified—such as pre-emptively stationing 
nuclear weapons “off-world” or testing a nuclear NEO response—could not 
be legally excused by a plea of necessity.  
The application of necessity also would require that the act was 
undertaken to avert “imminent” peril.360 As discussed in the context of the 
right of self-defense,361 while some experts have argued that it may be 
possible to implement nuclear planetary defense in a matter of days, it may 
well require more lead-time, and, nonetheless, it would be desirable for any 
interception mission to be launched as soon as was possible. This means 
that NEO response might not sit comfortably with the notion of imminence. 
In the context of necessity, however, the ICJ has made it clear that “a 
‘peril’ appearing in the long term might be held to be ‘imminent’ as soon as 
it is established . . . that the realization of that peril, however far off it may 
be, is not hereby any less certain and inevitable.”362 Thus, in principle, an 
NEO that was months or even years away from Earth still may be 
considered to represent an “imminent” peril for the purposes of a necessity 
defense, again depending on the degree of scientific confidence in the 
occurrence of an impact and its injurious implications.  
Finally, the act must not seriously impair an essential interest of other 
states for its illegality to be precluded by the necessity justification.363 At 
least in relation to a genuine act of planetary defense, a case could be made 
that the diversion of an NEO may in fact do the opposite: protecting not 
just the state acting, but others too.364 
Necessity is treated as an exceptional condition precluding 
wrongfulness, subject to strictly applied requirements to protect against 
abuse.365 However, its restrictive features would seem entirely appropriate 
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in the nuclear planetary defense context. The nuclear option, if entertained 
at all, should be reserved only for extreme cases where high degrees of 
certainty exist about the occurrence of significant harm and the lack of 
viable non-nuclear alternatives for averting it. The limitations that necessity 
would place on abstract, preparatory measures and testing would be 
desirable too, in light of the risks of aggressive repurposing. Necessity 
would only justify a use of nuclear weapons as a last resort where the NEO 
threat was verified, grave, and contextually imminent: it thus represents an 
appealing possible option for precluding wrongfulness. 
Despite its increased acceptance in modern international law, 
however, the defense of necessity is not uncontroversial, and issues have 
persisted about its scope and application in particular cases,366 as have fears 
about its potential abuse.367 Employing it to allow for the use of nuclear 
weapons in space may run into significant political opposition. This is 
especially likely given the inherently unilateral nature of a necessity 
defense. While the ICJ has been very clear that necessity claims must be 
subject to external objective evaluation,368 the invocation of necessity by a 
state or small group states, would, as with treaty withdrawal or self-
defense, stem from the “defenders” alone. As with the other defenses 
explored in this section, necessity still would amount to an uncertain, 
reactive, and ad hoc legal response. 
 
VIII.  A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL PREPAREDNESS 
 
Where does all this leave us? On the one hand, a majority of scientific 
experts indicate that in certain circumstances the use of a nuclear explosive 
device may be humanity’s best, or only, means of averting a catastrophe 
resulting from a large NEO impacting on Earth’s surface.369 On the other 
hand, it has been argued in this article that while significant uncertainties 
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remain, it would appear to be the case that a nuclear NEO response, if ever 
required, would be prohibited by existing treaty law.370  
One simply might take the view that this state of affairs is desirable. 
The inherent (security, environmental) risks of adopting a nuclear approach 
for planetary defense, coupled with the notably low risk of significant NEO 
impact occurring any time soon, may lead us to conclude that the game is 
not worth the candle. If anything, one might argue from this perspective 
that the legal uncertainties as to the application of the apparent prohibitions 
in the OST, LTBT, and (perhaps, indirectly) CTBT to NEO responses 
should be clarified so that nuclear planetary defense unquestionably would 
be unlawful. This may be something of a “head in the sand” approach when 
it comes to NEO threats in themselves, but in the wider context it would be 
a perfectly reasonable one. 
If one accepts that a nuclear response may be desirable as a last resort, 
however, another option would be to turn to existing legal mechanisms to 
preclude its prima facie unlawfulness, as were explored in section VI. 
Despite the widespread scholarly support for it, the right of self-defense 
almost certainly would be inapplicable here,371 but a state may be able to 
preclude the wrongfulness of a nuclear NEO mission that it was 
undertaking if it withdrew from the relevant treaties,372 or, preferably, 
invoked the defense of necessity.373 These options are legally plausible but 
not unproblematic, particularly as both would constitute unilateral legal 
shields for planetary defense. 
This author takes the view that it would be significantly preferable for 
any NEO response effort (and thus any legal approach that might seek to 
restrict or validate it) to be cooperative and multilateral in nature. A 
collision-course NEO likely would threaten the essential security interests 
of many, if not all, states.374 As with all global environmental concerns, 
multilateral, cooperative strategies would seem to be the most appropriate 
approach to mitigating that threat,375 allowing for the sharing of expertise 
and especially resources/cost.376 All states inherently have a “stake” in 
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NEO risk, meaning that one even can argue that, as a matter of social 
justice, they all possess a corresponding entitlement to at least some form 
of engagement with (or input into) any response initiative.377 A multilateral 
approach to nuclear responses in particular also would be crucial not just 
because of the shared nature of NEO impact risk, but also the risks 
associated with nuclear weapons. If humanity is willing to entertain the 
possibility of using nuclear weapons in this manner, a transparent, 
multilateral decision-making framework,378 incorporating sufficient 
safeguards,379 surely would be important to try to protect against abuse.380 
Resorting to the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII powers thus may 
seem more desirable than withdrawal or necessity, as this would entail at 
least a degree of communal decision-making and multilateralism.381 
However, as discussed,382 there exist uncertainties as to the scope of the 
Council’s legal power to sanction nuclear planetary defense, and the sin of 
inaction in the face of human disaster has remained a common element of 
the Council’s practice despite post-Cold War optimism.383 Perhaps the most 
preferable option amongst those explored in section VI would therefore be 
the temporary suspension of the relevant treaties through the agreement of 
the parties.384 This would constitute a response that could truly, if a little 
reductively, be said to come from “humanity.” Desirable as that might be, 
however, whether the required universal agreement for suspension would 
be realistically achievable remains another matter. 
The existing legal restrictions of the OST and LTBT were not 
designed to apply to NEO impact scenarios, but with other Cold War 
concerns in mind.385 The same is true for much newer (not binding, or at 
least not directly binding) provisions of the CTBT, TPNW, and PPWT, in 
that they too were developed without considering their implications for 
planetary defense. Both the relevant prohibitions (whether hard or soft) and 
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the possible defenses to them discussed in this article inherently are 
focused on inter-state rather than collective planetary security, and 
therefore arguably are not fit for purpose in the NEO context.386  
As such, one might look beyond the current law and its myriad of 
uncertainties. This article ultimately takes the view that the most desirable 
option of all would be to carve out a bespoke legal exception to the existing 
prohibitions. It is proposed that this should be restricted to “on-world” 
missions only, in cases where a large collision-course NEO was identified 
and verified (never before), and where the balance of independent scientific 
option clearly supported a nuclear response. The testing of the “nuclear 
option” and resort to pre-emptive measures such as stationing nuclear 
weapons in space just in case an NEO appears would remain prohibited.387 
Such restrictions to the proposed “exception” may decrease the chances of 
a response action being successful if the threat manifests, but the costs of 
allowing for testing and “off-world” preparatory nuclear measures (the 
need for which being scientifically disputed)388 simply are too high in the 
abstract.  
A bespoke and limited exception for an “on-world, actual peril” 
response would come with its own set of concerns, such as who would 
determine when it was triggered, who would action it (e.g., what if both the 
U.S. and Russia insisted on launching independent interception missions?), 
and who would oversee the resulting mission and assess its conformity with 
this legal exception.389 To promote certainty, protect against abuse and 
increase the chances of success through the pooling of expertise and 
resources, it therefore would be desirable for a legal multilateral decision-
making and oversight framework to be created.390 Ideally, this would 
amount to a bespoke body composed of all states (or as many states as 
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possible), which also included direct input from independently appointed 
scientific experts/organizations. 
As this article proposes, situating NEO response decision-making in a 
body composed of most (or all) states is concerning because this could 
have the potential terminally to slow down or block a response once an 
NEO has been identified.391 The “deadlock” problem inherent in turning to 
the Security Council or attempting to gain universal consent for treaty 
suspension would not disappear, but would be transferred to the proposed 
new decision-making and over-sight body. 
The difference, however, is that debate in the Security Council, or 
attempts to gain universal consent for treaty suspension, only would begin 
once we knew an NEO was on the way: the clock would already be ticking. 
A whole host of questions would exist as to what criteria should be applied 
in assessing whether to sanction a nuclear response. Whereas, while the 
exception proposed by this author would not allow for nuclear planetary 
defense actions to be taken in the abstract, the process of the creation of 
that exception (and its oversight body) could begin now, at a point where 
no time pressures exist. Explicit criteria thus could be developed to clarify 
that only an “on-world” approach would be permissible, in circumstances 
where a qualified majority of appointed independent NEO experts and a 
qualified majority of state members approved it (mitigating the “universal 
problem” that would exist for treaty suspension), as well as setting out 
appropriate requirements of proportionality, temporariness, transparency 
through reporting/oversight, and so on. 
All this would require either treaty amendment392 (especially to the 
LTBT, given that if the exception were limited to “on-world” approaches it 
would not in fact engage the OST), or, at least, the development of an 
additional protocol. Alternatively, a bespoke new treaty setting out a 
carefully restricted nuclear NEO response exception could be drafted.393 
State agreement for the implementation of any of these legal measures 
(whether treaty amendment, additional protocols, or an entirely new treaty) 
would—even in a best-case scenario—require extensive negotiation, and 
may ultimately be impossible to achieve. However, recent developments at 
the UN, such as the creation of SMPAG and IWAN,394 indicate that states 
increasingly are viewing a cooperative approach to NEO response as 
 
 391. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 392. See Kunich, supra note 12, at 150; Brooks, supra note 12, at 234, 247, 251; Gerrard 
& Barber, supra note 12, at 49. 
 393. Tronchetti, supra note 12, at 1041; Gerrard & Barber, supra note 12, at 49. 
 394. For discussion of these bodies, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
  
70 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
desirable,395 as do other current inter-state initiatives such as the AIDA 
mission.396 It is proposed that this spirit of cooperation be transferred to the 
legal level. 
A balance must be struck between the threat of an unlikely but 
catastrophic NEO impact and the threat that nuclear weapons themselves 
pose. Any proposed approach to handling this “irresistible force/immovable 
object” problem at the heart of the nuclear planetary defense concept will 
never be entirely satisfactory, but it would seem prudent for the 
international community to explore options for best achieving this balance 
now, rather than having to try to do so with an asteroid on the way. 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
Catastrophic Near-Earth Object impact—especially on a regional 
level—represents a genuine threat to human good (potentially even 
survival), albeit a low probability threat. Developments over the last five 
years in politics, science and technology indicate that humanity is better 
placed than ever before to respond to a “killer asteroid” should one appear. 
Many experts and states now appear to support a nuclear approach to NEO 
response, at least in extreme circumstances. Yet any resort to nuclear 
weapons, of course, itself also represents a genuine threat to human good. 
This article has explored the question of nuclear planetary defense, and has 
particularly examined whether such an action would or could be 
undertaken in conformity with international law.  
Despite the huge strides towards NEO preparedness recently 
witnessed at the political and scientific levels, at the legal level there still 
exists significant uncertainty. Were an incoming NEO requiring a nuclear 
response identified tomorrow, any state seeking to act would have to resort 
to contorted legal assessments of the LTBT, OST, and the various possible 
defenses to their breach, to be able to advance a claim that its interception 
mission was acceptable under existing international law. 
Perhaps more likely, and more worryingly, would be for a state to 
assert, as it seems some already have in the abstract,397 that the moral 
imperatives of planetary defense meant that any contradictory requirements 
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of unclear, Cold War era international law simply should be ignored.398 An 
extra-legal stance of that kind would have hugely damaging implications 
for the rule of law and integrity of the international legal system.399 Such 
side-stepping of legal norms would also mean that the use of nuclear 
weapons in space against an NEO would be undertaken in a de facto 
lawless vacuum.  
The international community should look to avoid this by taking steps 
towards legal preparedness. It has been proposed tentatively herein that it 
would be desirable for this to take the form of a limited, bespoke exception 
to the existing law and an associated multilateral decision-making and 
oversight body.400 Whether this proposal itself is seen as the suitable or not, 
the crucial point is that steps towards legal preparedness should begin now, 
at a time when controversies and details can be debated, probed and 
hopefully resolved, free from the time pressure that would exist if a 
collision-course NEO ever was identified.  
Any attempt at legal preparedness would be far from an easy or 
uncontroversial endeavor. Further research is needed to attempt to find the 
correct balance between protecting the planet from NEOs and protecting 
the planet from nuclear armaments. For good or ill, the political and 
scientific reality is that nuclear NEO response now exists as a genuine 
possibility. On the legal level, however, as things stand in relation to 
planetary defense, the maxim fiat justitia ruat cælum may apply too 
literally.401 
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